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ARTICLES
Status Courts
ERIN R. COLLINS*
This Article identifies and analyzes a new type of specialized "problem-
solving" court: status courts. Status courts are criminal or quasi-
criminal courts dedicated to defendants who are members of particular
status groups, such as veterans or girls. They differ from other problem-
solving courts, such as drug or domestic violence courts, in that nothing
about the status court offender or the offense he or she committed
presents a systemic "problem" to be "solved." In fact, status courts aim
to honor the offender's experience and strengthen the offender's associa-
tion with the characteristic used to sort him or her into court.
This Article positions status courts as both a troubling and promising
development in the evolution of problem-solving justice, in particular,
and criminal justice reform, generally. It reveals that status courts institu-
tionalize the notion that certain offenders, by virtue of their inclusion in a
particular status group, deserve better treatment than others. This "moral
sorting" provides an expressive release that may, counterintuitively,
disincentivize widespread systemic reform.
And yet, while status courts present cause for concern, they also
advance a positive, and possibly transformative, notion: that some indi-
viduals commit criminal offenses, at least in part, because of the influ-
ence of external factors beyond their control. In this way, status courts
challenge the retributive notion that criminal offenders are wholly inde-
pendent, rational actors and counterbalance the othering effect of many
current criminal justice practices. Because the rise of retributive ideals
played a prominent role in ramping up the penal machinery over the past
few decades, embracing this new, contextualized conceptualization of
criminal offenders-beyond the status court context-can temper the
tendency to over-incarcerate.
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INTRODUCTION
The rise of retributivism and its rational actor model of criminal behavior
helped pave the path toward the current era of mass incarceration. Conceptualiz-
ing criminal offenders as wholly independent agents who commit crimes devoid
of structural influences provided a theoretical justification for politicized "tough
on crime" policies and the harsh sentences they demanded. This alliance
between retributivist theory and criminal justice policy was undeniably power-
ful, leading to a prison population the United States lacks the capacity and
political will to sustain. As a result, many are seeking a way to relieve the
pressure of the fiscal and emotional costs of our current carceral crisis. In other
words, they are searching for a release valve.
An increasingly popular release mechanism is the creation of problem-
solving courts. Problem-solving courts are specialized criminal or quasi-
criminal courts that often substitute treatment, monitoring, or community service,
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alone or in combination, for incarceration,' and purport to provide a more
effective and efficient criminal justice intervention by focusing scarce resources
on recurring, systemic issues. They have emerged in a dizzying variety of
forms: drug courts, mental health courts, domestic violence courts, community
courts, gun courts, sex offender courts, homelessness courts, human trafficking
courts, and gambling courts.2
Many scholars, politicians, judges, and practitioners herald problem-solving
courts as a promising solution to the issues that plague our conventional
criminal justice system;3 others caution that problem-solving court participation
may be detrimental to defendants and question whether problem-solving courts
actually provide the release they promise.4 While debates ensue over whether
problem-solving courts are effective or normatively sound, a new development
is occurring that has implications for the future of problem-solving justice and
criminal justice reform more broadly: the emergence of a class of courts I call
".status courts."
Status courts are courts dedicated to offenders within a specific status group.
To date, two types of status courts have emerged: veterans courts and girls
courts. Although status courts have grown out of the modern problem-
solving court movement, they revive justifications offered for the creation of
juvenile courts many decades ago: that the populations they target are "niche"
1. See Collaborative Courts, SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL., COUNTY OF ORANGE (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.
occourts.org/directory/collaborative-courts/ [https://perma.cc/ATF2-HLDU] (defining problem-solving
courts as "specialized court tracks that address underlying issues that may be present in the lives of
persons who come before the court on criminal, juvenile, or dependency matters"). As will be addressed
below, however, problem-solving courts are not a monolithic entity but rather a diverse and varied
group.
Many commentators have rightly noted that the term "problem-solving" is overly ambitious and have
suggested the "slightly less hubristic" descriptor "problem-oriented." See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., LEGAL
ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT MOVEMENT 102-03, 148
(2009); see also Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1606 n.72 (2012) (describing the decision to use the term
"problem-oriented"); Mae C. Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of
Discourse and Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 57, 57 n.2 (2009)
(critiquing the term "problem-solving"). However problematic, I use the term "problem-solving court"
in this Article because that is how most commentators refer to these institutions.
2. See, e.g., Problem Solving Courts: Addressing a Spectrum of Issues, NAT'L Ass'N DRUG CT. PROFS.,
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/models/problem-solving-courts [https://perma.cc/RL2
B-3A88] (listing types of problem-solving courts); Problem-Solving Courts, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYs.:
OFFICE OF POL'Y & PLANNING, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem solving/ [https://perma.cclGEG5-
E8Y6] (listing types of problem-solving courts in New York state).
3. See, e.g., GREG BERMAN, Creating Good Courts: Effectiveness, Fairness and Problem-Solving
Justice, in REDUCING CRIME, REDUCING INCARCERATION: ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INNOVATION 83
(2014); Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement:
Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 468 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, A Circumspect Look at Problem-Solving Courts, in PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 13 (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds.,
2009); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug
Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.YU. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 50-52 (2000).
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groups with "unique" needs the system does not, but should, address.5 Status
courts differ from their problem-solving court predecessors in a key way: the
characteristic used to sort offenders into these courts does not present a sys-
temic "problem" to be "solved." In fact, the status court process is aimed at
strengthening the offenders' association with their status group and "honoring"
their experience.6 Toward that end, status courts are often staffed and even
presided over by other status group members.
Scholars have not yet acknowledged the ways in which status courts differ
from earlier generations of problem-solving courts nor considered what their
emergence reveals about the systemic consequences of problem-solving justice.
This Article embarks on that endeavor.
Examination of the justifications offered for status courts reveals new insights
about the distributive equity-or inequity-of the problem-solving court model
itself. The claim that the populations status courts target are unique does not
withstand scrutiny. And therein lies the danger of status courts: by invoking
specious claims that the needs of these populations are unique, status courts
obscure the connections between status court offenders and other offenders.
Status courts ultimately remove the populations who most highlight the sys-
tem's dysfunction, and in so doing they provide an expressive release that may
disincentivize systemic reform.
And yet, although status courts present cause for concern, they also reveal a
potential path to meaningful systemic reform-one that will not just release
pressure on the overburdened system, but fundamentally change how we con-
ceive of justice and punishment. They do so by advancing a new understanding
about the relationship between the state, the criminal offender, and the responsi-
bility for criminal behavior. A central move in the entrenchment of the war on
crime was the reconceptualization of the criminal offender as an individual who
committed crimes because of independent, rational choice uninfluenced by
extrinsic experiences or factors.7 Although earlier generations of problem-
solving courts appear to move away from this model, in fact they actually
continue to obscure the role of structural influences on criminal behavior.8
Status courts, by contrast, offer a more complex view of offenders as both
responsible agents and products of external circumstances. As such, they reject
the retributivist paradigm and indicate an ability and willingness of system
actors to acknowledge that external factors and experiences influence criminal
5. See Robert I. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive Approach, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& Civ. CONFINEMENT 357, 363 (2009).
6. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part III. See generally Mona Lynch, The Contemporary Penal Subject(s), in AFTER THE
WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION 89 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds.,
2008) (discussing prevailing conceptualizations of the criminal offender during the rehabilitative and
retributivist eras).
8. See infra Part III. See also Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. &
PoL'Y REV. 417, 425 (2009) (describing drug courts as deemphasizing access to government social
welfare services).
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behavior. I contend that applying these insights and practices broadly can help
guide us out of our current carceral crisis.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys the current landscape of
problem-solving justice and offers a broad classificatory scheme that catego-
rizes problem-solving courts based on the type of systemic problem they
purport to solve. It identifies two generations of courts that preceded status
courts: treatment courts, which aim to treat a problem with the defendant
believed to cause recidivistic behavior, and accountability courts, which moni-
tor and sanction defendants for offenses that have historically escaped the
criminal justice system's attention. It then introduces and contrasts status courts,
which depart from the utilitarian rationales that inspired and justified the
problem-solving court model. Part II identifies reasons to be concerned about
the development of status courts. It scrutinizes justificatory claims of status
courts and reveals that the needs said to be unique to veterans and girls are
actually shared by many offenders. I argue that by invoking a discourse of
difference to remove certain sympathetic populations from the conventional
system, status courts counterintuitively entrench the system's dysfunctional
treatment of offenders who are not chosen for specialized treatment. Part III
explores the promise of status courts. It demonstrates that they depart from their
problem-solving court predecessors in a way that has not yet been acknowl-
edged: they advance a contextualized conceptualization of criminality that
challenges the presumptions of the retributivist rational actor model. I conclude
by considering what it would mean to take this important yet underappreciated
development "to scale." 9 I argue that instead of creating additional specialty
courts-status or otherwise-we should encourage system actors to acknowl-
edge, as they do in status courts, that structural factors and experiences influ-
ence behavior, and use this insight to guide different kinds of investments in
criminal justice reform.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE
At their most general level, problem-solving courts are "simply specialized
courts that develop expertise with particular problems,"o and often offer treat-
ment, monitoring, or community service as an alternative or supplement to
9. I borrow this phrase from problem-solving court proponents, who often theorize about how to
take the lessons learned from problem-solving court experiments "to scale." See GREG BERMAN ET AL.,
GOOD COURrs: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 195 (2005) ("The goal of 'going to scale' is to
spread key problem-solving principles throughout state court systems.").
10. Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Foreword, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to
Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1508 (2003). The Center for Court Innovation, an
organization at the forefront of the problem-solving court movement that sponsors demonstration court
projects across the country, has identified three broad performance indicators that unite all problem-
solving courts: (1) an orientation toward "solving the underlying problems of litigants, victims, or
communities"; (2) interdisciplinary collaboration between individuals internal and external to the
criminal justice system; and (3) a focus on accountability. RACHEL PORTER ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT
INNOVATION, WHAT MAKES A COURT PROBLEM-SOLVING?: UNIVERSAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PROBLEM-
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incarceration. It is difficult to offer a more specific definition that encompasses
the full panoply of problem-solving courts. Indeed, these courts are defined by
their diversity. They differ in organizational theory, principle, and ultimate
promise." Some come into existence through legislation, others by judicial
fiat. 12 They employ a range of problem-solving methodologies. 13 The current
and ever-expanding roster of courts includes courts targeting drug addiction,
domestic violence, quality-of-life offenses, mental illness, homelessness, and
gun crimes.
Yet, although problem-solving courts are disparate and diverse, on a macro
level all purport to solve the same overarching systemic problem: the inefficient
and costly dysfunction that has resulted from decades of tough-on-crime poli-
cies. Indeed, a primary justification for the implementation of problem-solving
methodologies is that the conventional criminal justice system has devolved
into a depersonalized "assembly line" in which system actors struggle to
process cases as quickly as possible without regard to the efficacy or the
economic toll of such an approach.1 5 And each individual court responds to this
overarching problem in the same basic way-namely, by crafting a specialized
approach to a particular topical problem.1 6 They selectively remove particular
issues and populations from the conventional assembly line of justice instead of
redesigning the line itself. 17 In other words, problem-solving courts are release-
valve reforms that seek to relieve strain on the overburdened system. 8
At its core, then, problem-solving justice is selective justice. Surprisingly,
however, few have attempted to identify the selections that drive problem-
solving justice beyond reciting the ever-growing list of topical problem-solving
courts.1 9 Scholars have tended to focus on a specific topical court, and those
SOLVING JUSTICE iii-iv (2010), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/What MakesACourt
P S.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH5Z-WEU7].
11. See Greg Berman, Problem-Solving Justice and the Moment of Truth, in PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, supra note 4, at 1, 3-4 ("There is no single
foundational document, no unified theory, that summoned problem-solving courts into existence.").
12. See Sohil Shah, Authorization Required: Veterans Treatment Courts, the Need for Democratic
Legitimacy, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 67, 84 (2014).
13. See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1611 (concluding "there are at least four legal institutional and
conceptual reformist models to which the existing [specialized criminal] courts roughly correspond").
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15. See NOLAN, supra note 1, at 8 (listing as "[u]biquitous" among problem-solving court proponents
complaints about prison overcrowding, the expense of court case loads, the "'revolving door' phenom-
enon of repeat offenders," and the "assembly-line quality of 'McJustice"').
16. See BERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 5 (identifying as a "key element[ ] to the problem-solving
reform agenda" the creation of a "[t]ailored [a]pproach to [j]ustice").
17. In describing the rise of the problem-solving movement, prominent problem-solving-court
advocates Greg Berman and John Feinblatt explain that the point of the movement is not to decrease the
prominence of plea-bargaining justice, but rather to be honest about how the system operates and
change how parties act within that system. See id. at 20.
18. See Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 581, 585 (2012).
19. See Dorf & Fagan, supra note 10, at 1506-07 ("No commentators have yet suggested a heuristic
to decide which types of social problems and crimes are amenable to, or appropriate for, problem-
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who take a broader approach often "elide[] the differences between and among
various problem-solving models." 2 0 This inattention to the choices that drive
problem-solving justice prevents important critical inquiries-including who is
included and who is excluded from selective justice and the systemic conse-
quences of these choices.
As a way of starting those conversations, this Part attempts to make visible
the choices that drive problem-solving justice. In this way, it joins in the
burgeoning scholarly effort to typologize problem-solving courts in a way that
acknowledges their diversity while identifying their similarities. But it also
departs from that literature, which to date has focused on classifying the courts
by the methods they use to solve the specific problems to which they are
dedicated. 2 1 Instead of offering an on-the-ground look at how courts attempt to
solve problems or analyzing the efficacy and consequences of various problem-
solving approaches, this Part takes a broader look at the current landscape of
problem-solving justice, classifying courts based on the type of systemic prob-
lem they purport to solve. It is through this lens that status courts become
visible-and their differences come into relief.
A few preliminary notes about the classification are in order. Its purpose is to
make sense of the current landscape of problem-solving justice by identifying
and categorizing the organizational claims of different topical courts. It captures
most-and the most popular-problem-solving courts, and it operates on the
level of rhetoric, not practice. It classifies the courts based on what their
proponents claim they do, not on how 2 2 or whether they accomplish their stated
goals.23
I have identified particular types of courts as belonging to separate "genera-
tions" that begin when each particular organizational orientation emerges. I use
this term to help convey the general temporal progression of the emergence of
each type of court, but the generations overlap and coexist. For example, even
solving courts, and what conditions must exist for courts to take this step. There are now specialized
courts for mentally ill offenders, drunk drivers, parole or probation violators, gun carriers, domestic
violence offenders, and several other types of offenses and offenders. Why these problems and not
others?" (footnote omitted)).
20. BERMAN, supra note 3, at 86 ("Drug courts are different than community courts. Community
courts are different than mental health courts. Mental health courts are different than domestic violence
courts. It is worth keeping these distinctions in mind before drawing broad conclusions.").
21. For example, Allegra McLeod recently offered an extensive typology that distinguished problem-
solving courts based on their "criminal law reformist model": therapeutic jurisprudence, judicial
monitoring, order maintenance, and decarceration. See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1611-44; see also
LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE CouRrs 96-97 (2011) (distinguishing between specialized criminal
courts that treat certain offenses more seriously from those that attempt to address the root causes of
crime).
22. For a rich analysis of the diverse criminal law reformist models problem-solving courts employ,
see McLeod, supra note 1, at 1611-44.
23. Whether the problem-solving-court enterprise is effective is a separate and highly contested
topic. See generally infra Part III.
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though drug courts belong to the first generation, they continue to proliferate.2 4
Finally, while the classification I offer below is unique, existing scholarship has
already provided extensive descriptive accounts of the individual courts that fall
within the first two generations of courts I identify. However, because status
courts are new phenomena that have for the most part escaped scholarly
attention, I describe them in greater detail.
A. FIRST GENERATION: TREATMENT COURTS
The treatment court is the prototypical and most prevalent problem-solving-
court model.25 The organizational principle of treatment courts is that a specific
problem with the defendant or the defendant's circumstances contributes to the
defendant's criminal behavior. These courts attempt to solve that problem and,
by extension, prevent or reduce the offender's future involvement with the
criminal justice system. The paradigmatic treatment court is the drug court, the
first of which opened in 1989.26 Drug courts embrace the idea that drug
addiction is criminogenic and, therefore, that treating the addiction instead of
incarcerating the defendant is a more effective and long-lasting response to
drug-related criminal behavior. Most treatment courts, like drug courts, are
dedicated to addressing a specific problem internal to the defendant, such as
various forms of addiction 2 7 or mental illness, 28 but this class of courts also
includes those that address problems external to the defendant, such as homeless-
24. For example, six new drug courts were slated to open in Minnesota in 2014. See Six New Drug
Courts to Open in Minnesota, MINN. JUD. BRANCH (June 30, 2014), http://www.ncourts.gov/?page=
NewsltemDisplay&item=59715%20 [https://perma.cc/5N34-8GCN].
25. For example, as of 2015, there were more than 3,000 drug courts in operation in the United
States. See How Many Drug Courts Are There?, NAT'L DRUG CT. RESOURCE CTR. (June 31, 2015),
http://www.ndcrc.org/content/how-many-drug-courts-are-there [https://perma.cc/2PRJ-BAWM]. In con-
trast, the combined number of other types of problem-solving courts as of June 2014 was approxi-
mately 1,200. How Many Problem-Solving Courts Are There?, NAT'L DRUG CT. RESOURCE CTR. (June
30, 2014), http://www.ndcrc.org/content/how-many-problem-solving-courts-are-there [https://perma.cc/
JWB4-35ST].
26. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAw & PoL'Y 125,
126 (2001). See generally McLeod, supra note 1, at 1605 (noting that drug courts are the "original and
most numerous" form of specialized criminal court). As of June 2015, there were more than 3,000 drug
courts operating in the United States. See Drug Courts, NAT'L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/
drug-courts/Pages/welcome.aspx [https://perma.cc/LTW3-PRA5].
27. In addition to courts addressing drug addiction, some jurisdictions have opened courts for those
who commit crimes because of gambling addiction. See Ken Belson, New York Gambling Treatment
Court Stresses Help, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/01/nyregion/01gamble.
html?pagewanted print&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/G28B-FERD]; see also GAMBLING CT., http://www.
gamblingcourt.org/ [https://perma.cc/2SD9-KVAJ] (describing gambling court as a "therapeutic,
intervention and rehabilitative approach ... for defendants who commit non-violent crimes because of
gambling addiction").
28. Mental health courts are "designed to use problem-solving methods to increase the responsive-
ness of the criminal justice system to seriously mentally-ill offenders, linking them with needed social
and health services in an effort to reduce the likelihood of re-offense." PORTER ET AL., supra note 10, at
18. Currently, there are approximately 300 mental health courts in operation nationwide. See Mental
Health Courts, COUNCIL ST. Gov'TS JUST. CTR., http://csgjusticecenter.org/mental-health-court-project/
[https://perma.cc/C475-WA7H].
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29 30
ness or gang membership.
The creation of a treatment plan is central to the project of solving the
defendant's criminogenic problem, the issue believed to cause his or her crimi-
nal behavior. The scope of the plan is within the court's discretion, but usually
requires the defendant to participate in rehabilitative programs aimed at address-
ing the problem believed to have contributed to his or her criminal activity, such
as substance abuse, mental illness, or gang membership. 31 Although ideally,
treatment replaces incarceration, it is executed in a carceral shadow; a defen-
dant's failure to complete the treatment plan will result in the imposition of
more traditional criminal sanctions, which may include jail or prison time.32
B. SECOND GENERATION: ACCOUNTABILITY COURTS
Soon after the first drug treatment court opened in 1989, the model was
adapted to other problems. 3 3 By the mid-1990s, a new generation of problem-
29. See Tamar M. Meekins, "Specialized Justice": The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the
Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006) (discussing the
opening of the first homeless court in San Diego, California, in 1989). Currently, there are a few dozen
homeless courts in the United States. See Homeless Courts, AM. B. Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/publicservices/homelessness povertyinitiatives/homelesscourts.html [https://perma.cc/72YK-
4E6L] (listing U.S. jurisdictions with presently operating homeless courts).
30. See SUSAN L. HAHN & ROBYN BERNDT, GANG COURT YAKIMA COUNTY, WASHINGTON: A SUMMARY
REPORT OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE JUNE 7, 2012, at 1 (2012), http://www.kl2.wa.us/
safetycenter/Gangs/pubdocs/2012June/GangCourtYakimaCountySummaryReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W64A-FXNA] (discussing the first juvenile gang court, which opened in Washington state in 2011).
31. See, e.g., Dylan Goforth, Tulsa Homeless Court Docket Aims to Provide Counseling, TULSA
WORLD (May 9, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/tulsa-homeless-court-docket-
aims-to-provide-counseling/article f63088e8-2c9e-5957-ba04-9f28562058f2.html [https://perma.cc/
PDX4-B5ZT] (explaining that Tulsa's new homeless court requires participants to comply with a
treatment plan under court supervision in order for their cases to be dismissed); HAHN & BERNDT, supra
note 30, at 1 (noting the Yakima County Gang Court requires participants to "engage in a highly
therapeutic, structured, intensive" program "geared toward rehabilitation from gang lifestyle and
gang-related crime").
32. Most treatment courts ascribe to a post-plea dispositional model, under which the defendant
must plead guilty before attempting the treatment plan. See, e.g., WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B.
MARLOWE, NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS
AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 24-25 (2011) (noting that, as of
2009, fifty-eight percent of adult drug courts exclusively followed a post-plea model). If the defendant
succeeds in treatment and meets all of the criteria the court has set, the court will withdraw the plea or,
alternatively, let the conviction stand but reduce or eliminate the defendant's exposure to incarceration.
Id. A shrinking minority of courts operate on a pre-plea model under which the prosecution or
adjudication of the charges are suspended while the defendant attempts treatment. See id. at 24-25
(noting that, as of 2009, twelve percent of drug courts followed a pre-plea model while twenty percent
followed a hybrid model). Under the pre-plea model, the charges are dismissed if the defendant
succeeds. See id. at 24.
Many homeless courts are an exception to this model. Often homeless court participants are referred
to court to clear up pending criminal matters after they have completed therapeutic services, rehabilita-
tive services, or both. See, e.g., Homeless Court, COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, http://www.
homelesshouston.org/homeless-court/homeless-court-details/ [https://perma.cc/8387-EYDN]. The
rehabilitative efforts replace custody or fines. See id.
33. See, e.g., Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process ofAccountability: Consensus and
Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (2003) (noting
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 105:1481
solving court was emerging: what I will term here "accountability courts." 3 4
The organizing principle that unites the diverse group accountability courts is
that some offenses-such as domestic violence and low-level "quality-of-life"
crimes-have "slipped through the cracks" of the criminal justice system,35
allowing certain offenders to escape justice and leaving certain victims insuffi-
ciently protected.36 Accountability courts seek to remedy this historical over-
sight by increasing offender accountability to the victims of their behavior. The
victim, for accountability court purposes, may be an individual or the
community. 37
that the Red Hook Community Justice Center "follows the drug court model" by adopting a collabora-
tive, service-oriented approach).
34. The first community court opened in Midtown Manhattan in 1993. See Community Court-
Overview, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.org/topic/community-court [https://perma.
cc/Z85V-SM6N]. The first felony domestic violence court opened in Brooklyn, New York, in 1996. See
LISA NEWMARK ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, SPECIALIZED FELONY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS: LESSONS ON
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACTS FROM THE KINGS COUNTY EXPERIENCE 1 (2001), http://www.courtinnovation.
org/sites/default/files/SpecializedFelonyDomesticViolenceCourts.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSJ7-6JV3].
35. Ass'N OF PROSECUTING AITORNEYS, STEARNS COUNTY, MN REPEAT FELONY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
COURT: PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION BEST PRACTICE GUIDE 1 (2013), http://prosecutingattorneys.org/wp-
content/uploads/Stearns-County-DV-Implementation-Guide-FINAL_1-17-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9367-8Z4W] ("[Before the domestic violence court opened,] domestic violence offenders and their
victims were falling through the cracks of the criminal justice system-offenders were not being held
accountable for their violence and instead were committing multiple felony offenses against their
partners. The victims of these violent assaults were not being linked to services and their safety was
jeopardized."); ROBIN CAMPBELL, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, 'THERE ARE No VICTIMLESS CRIMES':
COMMUNITY IMPACT PANELS AT THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT 2 (2000), http://www.courtinnovation.org/
sites/default/files/No%20Victimless%20Crimesl.pdf [https://perma.ccl4FL7-QKES] (contrasting the prac-
tices of the Midtown Community Court with the "previous practice in which the city's overburdened
courts let low-level offenders slip through the cracks" and "cases were often dismissed or offenders
were sentenced to 'time served"'); see also KELLI HENRY & DANA KRALSTEIN, CTR. FOR COURT
INNOVATION, COMMUNITY COURTS: THE RESEARCH LITERATURE 11 (2011) (identifying a goal of community
courts as decreasing the number of "'walks'-sentences such as a fine or 'time served' in which
offenders receive no ongoing sanction despite pleading guilty to criminal conduct"); Adriaan Lanni,
The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 373 (2005) (noting the "irony" that
community court approaches "have been deployed largely against activities that were not previously
targeted for any significant sanction").
36. Interestingly, the two most popular types of accountability courts-domestic violence courts and
community courts-both emerged, at least in part, in response to shifting police practices that
introduced new types of defendants into the criminal justice system. Domestic violence courts were a
response to mandatory arrest policies, especially after the 1994 passage of VAWA, see MELISSA
LABRIOLA ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, A NATIONAL PORTRAIT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS 2
(2010), and community courts were responses to "broken windows" policing strategies. See Anthony C.
Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 63, 66
(2002) (discussing connection between broken-windows-inspired community-policing strategies and
community courts).
37. Community courts reconceptualize some traditionally "victimless" crimes, such as prostitution,
as victimizing the surrounding neighborhood, especially the business owners. See, e.g., CAMPBELL,
supra note 35, at 2 ("The [Midtown Community] Court, founded in 1993 to address crimes like
prostitution, shoplifting and drug possession, is guided by the principle that there is no such thing as a
victimless crime. The Court views the community as the victim of quality-of-life offenses and, where
appropriate, it sentences offenders to perform community service to repair the damage they've done.").
1490
2017] STATUS COURTS 1491
Accountability is a malleable concept; 3 8 I use accountability here to mean
holding an offender responsible. Because accountability is such an amorphous
goal, the category of accountability courts encompasses a wide range of special-
ized courts that scholars tend to distinguish, including, most prominently,
domestic violence courts 39 and community courts,4 0 but also sex offense courts 41
and gun courts.42 A key feature that distinguishes accountability courts from
treatment courts is an emphasis on the twin and often overlapping goals of
offender accountability and victim protection over-or instead of-offender
rehabilitation.4 3 Although some accountability courts offer treatment, the treat-
ment often supplements, but does not replace, a formal sanction-increasing
victim safety and offender accountability take precedence.4 4 And many account-
ability courts that offer treatment programs do so primarily as a way to increase
45
offender monitoring and accountability, not for rehabilitative purposes.
38. See LABRIOLAETAL., supra note 36, at 9.
39. The Center for Court Innovation describes domestic violence and sexual assault courts as
designed "to improve the safety of victims and their children, [and] enhance offender accountability."
Domestic Violence-Overview, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.org/topic/domestic-
violence [https://perma.cc/RGM4-LWG4]. A recent nationwide survey of domestic violence court
stakeholders revealed a consensus around the "primary rationales" for creating domestic violence
courts: "increased victim safety, offender accountability, and deterring of future violence." LABRIOLA
ET AL., supra note 36, at ix.
40. See HENRY & KRALSTEIN, supra note 35, at 1 (identifying "greater accountability for low-level,
'quality-of-life' offenders" as a goal of community courts).
41. See Sex Offense Courts: Mission and Goals, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYs.: OFFICE OF PoL'Y &
PLANNING, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problemsolving/so/mission-goals.shtml [https://perma.cc/
E7JY-DSUR] ("Sex Offense Courts promote justice by providing a comprehensive approach to case
resolution, increasing sex offender accountability, enhancing community safety while protecting the
rights of defendants.").
42. DAVID SHEPPARD & PATRICIA KELLY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE GUN CouRis: PROMOTING
ACCOUNTABLITY AND PROVIDING TREATMENT 3 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/187078.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5GU-RQJ9] (identifying a primary goal of juvenile gun court as providing "early
intervention and greater accountability for juveniles charged with weapons offenses").
43. See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1609 ("In contrast to drug courts, mental health courts, and
veterans courts, domestic violence courts and sex offense courts generally operate with less reference to
rehabilitative goals."); PORTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 12 (noting that some models of problem-solving
courts, "notably domestic violence courts and to a lesser extent community courts, focus less on
therapeutic interventions for the defendant and more on defendant responsibility to the party harmed-
whether that is an individual or a community"). For example, a recent national survey of domestic
violence courts found that eighty-three percent rated increasing victim safety as an "extremely
important" goal and seventy-nine percent rated holding offenders accountable as "extremely impor-
tant." LABRIOLA ET AL., supra note 36, at v-vi. By contrast, only twenty-seven percent identified
rehabilitating offenders as "extremely important." Id.
44. See, e.g., REBECCA THOMFORDE-HAUSER & JULI ANA GRANT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, SEX
OFFENSE COURTS: SUPPORTING VICTIM AND COMMUNITY SAFETY THROUGH COLLABORATION 4 (2010) ("Sex
offense courts are not designed primarily to provide alternatives to incarceration. Although sex offender
treatment is encouraged as part of community release and supervision, the court's primary goals are to
improve consistency, coordination, community collaboration and accountability.").
45. See BERMAN, supra note 3, at 86 ("When community courts sentence low-level offenders to
perform community service, it's not because they're trying to 'heal' the offenders, it's because they
want to pay back the local neighborhood that's been harmed by crime. When domestic violence courts
require batterers to return to court for judicial monitoring of their compliance with orders of protection,
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C. THIRD GENERATION: STATUS COURTS
Recently, a new generation of problem-solving courts has begun to emerge:
what I call here "status courts." The organizational principle of status courts is
that offenders who belong to certain status groups have unique needs that the
conventional justice system does not, but should, meet. Status courts seek to
solve this systemic oversight by offering services and treatment options specifi-
cally tailored to the needs of the populations they target.
To date, status courts have emerged to address two status groups: veterans
and girls. Veterans courts are criminal courts that offer intensive supervision,
coordinated services, and treatment as an alternative to incarceration for crimi-
nal defendants who have served in the United States military.46 Judge Robert
Russell opened the nation's first veterans court in 2008 based on his observation
that "veterans are a niche population with unique needs" who require "tailored
care." 47 The uniqueness of veterans' needs are said to derive from the impact of
military service, in particular the traumatic and potentially criminogenic impact
of combat. 48 This model has proliferated quickly. By July 2014, just six years
after the first court's opening, approximately 200 veterans courts had opened.49
Girls courts are gender-specific juvenile courts that adjudicate delinquency
charges against female offenders.50 Like veterans courts, girls courts reflect a
judgment that those who come before them have special, unmet needs that
distinguish them from the general offender population and require specialized
it's not with any therapeutic intent, it's to try to make sure they don't continue to abuse their partners.");
see also LABRIOLA ET AL., supra note 36, at 57 (reporting that ninety-four percent of domestic violence
courts participating in the study indicated accountability was an "extremely" or "very" important reason
for ordering offenders to attend a batterer program); NOLAN, supra note 1, at 201 n.46 (quoting a
domestic violence court judge who assigns offenders to drug treatment and batterer intervention
programs "for monitoring purposes").
46. See Russell, supra note 5, at 364-65.
47. Id. at 363.
48. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
49. Kristen Meriwether, Veterans Treatment Courts Offer Hope, but Only in Three Boroughs,
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.gothamgazette.com/government/5279-veterans-treatment-
courts-offer-hope-but-only-in-three-boroughs [https://perma.cc/DV8Q-4M6F] (noting that 197 courts
had been created as of July 28, 2014, according to Justice for Vets). Such growth was bolstered by
federal support for veterans court initiatives. As part of his 2011 Strengthening Our Military Families
initiative, President Obama identified the need to "[m]ake court systems more responsive to the unique
needs of Veterans and Families," and announced a commitment to "address the root causes of criminal
behavior and reduce involvement with the criminal justice system" by providing federal support for the
further development of the "Veterans Treatment Court concept." See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
STRENGTHENING OUR MILITARY FAMILIES: MEETING AMERICA'S COMMITMENT 12 (2011), http://www.defense.
gov/home/features/2011/0111initiative/strengthening our military january 2011.pdf [https://perma.
cc/79K2-U8JL].
50. Girls courts are juvenile courts, not criminal courts. However, others have discussed specialty
juvenile courts as types of problem-solving courts. See, e.g., SHEPPARD & KELLY, supra note 42, at 2
(defining juvenile drug courts as a "specialty court, characterized by small caseloads, frequent hearings,
immediate sanctions, family involvement, and treatment services").
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attention.5 ' The first modern girls court 52 opened in Oahu, Hawaii in 2004
because "[g]irls in the juvenile justice system have special needs that were not
being met by a system traditionally designed for boys."5 3 The Hawaii State
Judiciary specifies, "female juvenile offenders tend to be victims of physical,
sexual, and emotional abuse and experience depression and low self-esteem that
are linked to at-risk behaviors and delinquency." 5 4 It also identifies "[s]ubstance
abuse and school failure" as "prominent characteristics of at-risk girls."5 5
Thus, the Oahu court focuses on programs that address "issues such as
healing from physical, sexual and emotional abuse, family conflict, substance
abuse, depression, suicidal ideation and attempts, and self-injurious behav-
iors."5 The court also emphasizes "activities that focus on empowerment,
self-respect, and self-efficacy."5 7 Although girls courts predated the first veter-
ans court by four years, they have spread less rapidly; to date only a handful of
girls courts have opened nationwide, most recently in Duval County, Florida, in
September 2014.
Status courts resemble treatment courts in both ideology and structure. 5 9 Like
treatment courts, status courts primarily adopt a therapeutic jurisprudence ap-
proach to problem-solving justice, promoting treatment and rehabilitation as a
way to reduce recidivism. Veterans courts explicitly model themselves on drug
51. The first "Program Value" of Hawaii Girls Court is "Honoring the Female Experience," which
involves addressing "the unique needs of girls." Our Mission, HAw. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/
mission.html [https://perma.cc/9QQS-3XPV].
52. A similar venture was undertaken by Chicago's first female assistant judge, Mary Bartelme, in
1913 to hear cases of dependent and delinquent girls. See Bernardine Dohrn, Investigating the Rights of
Youths: Schooling and the Vexing Social Control of Girls, AM. B. Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/publicseducation/initiatives awards/students in action/dohrn.html [https://perma.cc/9BRQ-
CJAT].
53. Girls Court, HAw. ST. JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/special projects/girlscourt.html
[https://perma.cc/J9AH-7GNF]; see also About Us, HAw. GIRLS C., http://www.girlscourt.org/aboutus.
html [https://perma.ccIW35N-D3XE](stating that the Girls Court opened as a "laboratory to design
gender-specific policies, programs and services to achieve outcomes that more successfully and
effectively target at-risk and delinquent girls").
54. Girls Court, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. About Us, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. A report about the September 2014 opening of Girls Court in Duval County, Florida, identified it
as the seventh such court in the country. See Ashley Mitchem, Girls Court Launches in Duval County,
NEwS4JAX (Sept. 17, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.news4jax.com/news/girls-court-launches-in-duval-
county/28102998 [https://perma.cc/23D4-C2Z3]; cf Patricia Leigh Brown, A Court's All-Hands Ap-
proach Aids Girls Most at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/us/
a-courts-all-hands-approach-aids-girls-most-at-risk.html [https://perma.cc/9YYB-KNJV] (noting the ex-
istence of "a half-dozen or so Girls Courts around the country").
59. See Tiffany Cartwright, "To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle": The Recent
Development of Veterans Treatment Courts in America, 22 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 295, 307 (2011)
(noting that the treatment of veterans court participants "strongly resembles a program in a drug or
mental health court").
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courts,6 0 and aim to "successfully habilitate veterans."6' Girls courts similarly
adopt a "[t]herapeutic modalit[y] and approach[],"62 and embrace the character-
istics of many treatment courts, such as intensive supervision and therapeutic
services provided by a coordinated, multidisciplinary team. 6 3 And as in treat-
ment courts, status courts regularly monitor participants and mete out positive
reinforcement or graduated sanctions, depending on the participant's progress.6 4
Because status courts are similar to treatment courts, those who have ana-
lyzed courts that fall within the category have mistakenly characterized them as
simply a new type of treatment court.6 5 However, status courts differ from
treatment courts in an important and definitive way: the characteristic used to
filter offenders into the court is not a "problem" to be "solved." So in contrast to
drug courts, for example, which aim to treat the underlying drug addiction that
contributed to the criminal behavior, status courts do not seek to break the
offender's connection with the characteristic around which the court is orga-
nized; when the status court offender is finished with the court process, he or
she will not stop being a veteran or a girl. Instead, as the following discussion
demonstrates, status courts take affirmative steps to strengthen the offender's
association with his or her status group.
The animating justification for status courts is that neither the conventional
court system nor existing problem-solving courts adequately address the purport-
60. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, VETERANS TREATMENT
COURTS 1 (noting that veterans courts are "modeled after drug courts"). In some jurisdictions, veterans
courts are situated within existing drug treatment or mental health courts. See, e.g., Veterans Courts,
N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYs.: OFFICE OF PoL'Y & PLANNING, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem solving/
vet/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/87WH-36JE](explaining that New York veterans courts are "a sepa-
rate court calendar within an existing drug treatment or mental health court"); Veterans Court Addresses
Special Needs, ST. MISs. JUDICIARY (Jan. 26, 2012), https://courts.ms.gov/news/2012/01%2013%2012
Krebs%20Veterans%20Court.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8Y7-XN45] (noting that the planned veterans court
will operate "within the existing Drug Court").
61. Vision and Mission, BUFFALO VETERANS TREATMENT CT., http://www.buffaloveteranscourt.org/about
mission [https://perma.cclYSU9-XSJP].
62. About Us, supra note 53.
63. See, e.g., Thomas Carroll, Gender and Juvenile Justice: New Courts, Programs Address Needs
of Girls, NAT'L CTR. FOR YOUTH L. (Oct. 1, 2009), http://youthlaw.org/publication/gender-and-juvenile-
justice-new-courts-programs-address-needs-of-girls/ [https://perma.cc/ZA7A-8EM5] (services offered
in San Mateo's GIRLS program include "individual and family counseling, Narcotics Anonymous and
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings where needed, counseling for rape and sexual trauma, and regular
visits by a speaker from SAGE (Standing Against Global Exploitation), an organization for survivors of
commercial sexual exploitation").
E.S.T.E.E.M. Court offers "intensive supervision, weekly court hearings, individual and group
therapy, in-home family therapy, and mentorship with community leaders." E.S.TE.E.M. Court, DALL.
COUNTY Juv. DEP'T, http://www.dallascounty.org/department/juvenile/esteem.php [https://perma.ccl2ZF
C-7PSR].
64. See About Us, supra note 53 (explaining that "court sessions serve to provide positive reinforce-
ment of their strengths and accomplishments as well as a method for imposing graduated sanctions and
creating accountability for the girls"); see also Russell, supra note 5, at 364-67 (identifying the "key
components" of the Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court's programming and services).
65. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 5, at 365 (describing the Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court as "a
hybrid of drug and mental health treatment courts").
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edly unique needs of these particular populations. When Judge Russell opened
the first veterans court in Buffalo, New York, he presided over the city's drug
and mental health courts but believed that these courts were "limited" in their
ability to serve veterans. 6 Veterans, he concluded, "derive from a unique
culture, with unique experiences and needs" and, therefore, require a "unique
program" that specifically targets their needs.6
Girls courts similarly reflect a judgment that they target a distinctive popula-
tion whose needs were being overlooked by the conventional system. The first
girls court opened in 2004 as part of the effort to "stem" what was perceived to
be a "quickly rising tide of female delinquency";68 whereas the rates of juvenile
delinquency were dropping overall, the rate of girls entering the juvenile system
was increasing. 69 Although the increase eventually was determined to be the
result of changes in policing strategies, not behavioral patterns,7 0 the statistics
inspired the creation of "gender-responsive" juvenile justice programs, includ-
ing girls courts. Girls courts embrace the twin presumptions that motivate all
gender-responsive programming: that boys and girls are fundamentally differ-
ent72 and the conventional juvenile justice system, including the "[s]taffing
patterns, staff training, classification systems, physical design, and the correc-
66. See Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts Developing Throughout the Nation, in FUTURE
TRENDS IN STATE COURrs 2009 130, 130 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2009), http://www.ndcrc.org/sites/
default/files/futuretrends_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4P7-A4ME] [hereinafter Russell, Veterans Treat-
ment Courts]; see also Russell, supra note 5, at 364 (describing the founding and mission of the Buffalo
Veterans Treatment Court).
67. Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts, supra note 66, at 130.
68. HAw. GIRLS C., http://www.girlscourt.org [https://perma.cclN35L-BCWD].
69. JEFF SLOWIKOWSKI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
IN Focus: GIRLS' DELINQUENCY 1 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228414.pdf [https://perma.
cc/347Z-TFY9] ("In 1980, females represented 11 percent of juvenile arrests for violent offenses. By
2000, that proportion had grown to 18 percent, and by 2004 it had risen to 30 percent. Even though
arrest numbers remained higher for boys than girls during that period, arrest rates for girls increased
while rates for boys decreased."). OJJDP established the Girls Study Group to "investigate the roots of
and solutions to girls' delinquency." Id. For more information on female juvenile delinquency statistics
see Frequently Asked Questions, HAw. GIRLS Ci., http://www.girlscourt.org/faq.html [https://perma.cc/
EG99-D2GU] [hereinafter FAQs, HAW. GIRLS Ci.] (quoting statistics about increasing female juvenile
delinquency rates in Hawaii and nationally). For more statistics, see FRANCINE T. SHERMAN, ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUND., PATHWAYS To JUDICIAL DETENTION REFORM, SER. No. 13, DETENTION REFORM AND GIRLS:
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 10-11 (2005), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/AECF-DetentionReform
AndGirls-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FZP-5VSP].
70. See Margaret A. Zahn et al., Violence by Teenage Girls: Trends and Context, GIRLS STUDY GROUP
SERIES (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.C.), May 2008, at
8, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/218905.pdf [https://perma.cc/K95L-4HCF].
71. For further discussion of the emergence of gender-responsive programming, see OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GENDER-SPECIFIC PROGRAMMING
(2010), http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/Gender-SpecificProgramming.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4G
Q-K4KH].
72. See SHERMAN, supra note 69, at 16. The Hawaii Girls Court, for example, seeks to "recognize the
fundamental differences between male and female juvenile offenders as well as their different pathways
to delinquency . . . ." HAW. GIRLS CT., supra note 68.
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tional routine," were designed "for a male juvenile population."73
Thus, although they serve very different populations, both veterans courts
and girls courts stem from a similar concern. Both justify the specialized justice
they offer with claims that the populations they serve have "unique needs" that
are not-and cannot be-satisfied in the conventional system, requiring the
creation of a new institution dedicated only to members of that status group. In
this way, status courts-though they grew out of the modern problem-solving
court movement-echo the claims offered in support of the creation of juvenile
courts. In some ways juvenile courts were the first problem-solving court. For
example, they were the first to make the system respond more effectively to
particular types of offenders by carving out separate court processes and
procedures. But there is an even stronger parallel between juvenile courts and
status courts. Juvenile courts were created, in large part, because reformers
believed the adult criminal court system was "unfit to address the underlying
issues that brought a young person to court" and "[un]able to distinguish the
special developmental needs of children in order to treat them differently than
adults."
Yet, status courts strive to meet a unique goal that distinguishes them from
their problem-solving court predecessors, both modern and historic: they aim to
honor the experience of the offenders. The "goal" of the Hot Springs Veterans
Treatment court, for example, is to "help those that served our nation and honor
their service, and the brochure for the Maricopa County, Arizona Veterans
Court calls on the reader to "honor our military, [t]he men and women who
serve."77 The first "Program Value" upon which the Hawaii Girls Court bases its
"decision making and actions" is "[h]onoring the [f]emale [e]xperience." 78
Thus, status courts' process is not just about what the offender should change,
but also what they should respect in themselves. If the process succeeds, the
offender leaves court proud of the characteristic that brought him or her into the
court. As Judge Michael Brennan reminds the defendants who appear in his
veterans court: "You are a Marine," adding, "Once a Marine-always a
73. Sherman, supra note 69, at 24 (arguing that the application of this "male model may be
particularly damaging" for girls); see also Girls Court, supra note 53 ("Girls in the juvenile justice
system have special needs that were not being met by a system traditionally designed for boys.").
74. Professor Jane Spinak, for example, has identified family court-a term she uses interchangeably
with juvenile court-as the "paradigmatic problem-solving court." Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the
Court, 46 FAM. CT. REv. 258, 259 (2008); see also Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1056 (2003) (identifying juvenile court as "the
forerunner of . .. specialized [problem-solving] courts").
75. Spinak, supra note 74, at 259.
76. Garland County CARES Teams Up with Hot Springs Veterans Treatment Court, SENTINEL-
REcoRD, July 27, 2014, at 4C, http://www.pressreader.com/usalthe-sentinel-record/20140727/282140699
510541/TextView.
77. Brochure, Superior Court of Ariz. in Maricopa Cty., Veterans Court, https://www.superiorcourt.
maricopa.gov/MediaRelationsDepartment/docs/brochures/vetsCourtbrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ACS8-U4BX].
78. Our Mission, supra note 51.
1496 [Vol. 105:1481
2017] STATUS COURTS 1497
Marine." 79
To accomplish this goal, status courts strive to create a courtroom environ-
ment in which members of the status group play a prominent role. Veterans
court proponents stress that veterans require services administered by people
who "are knowledgeable about and able to empathize with the military experi-
ence," 80 namely other veterans. 1 Toward that end, veterans courts feature a
distinctive and definitive programming component: a mentorship program that
pairs defendants with noncriminally involved veterans.8 2 These programs aim to
provide defendants with support, guidance, and assistance throughout the court
process, to provide a "healthy role model who has 'been there,"' and above all
else to remind the defendants that they are not alone.83 Tellingly, the Buffalo
mentor program follows the motto "leave no veteran behind."84 Some courts
take this effort to instill "camaraderie among those who served" one step
further, attempting to staff the courts with judges, court officers, and defense
attorneys who have served in the military. 5 And in Brooklyn, New York, even
the appearance of the courtroom is transformed: the usually barren walls are
decorated with military posters, and a flag of the U.S. Marine Corps sits on the
judge's bench to signal that the judge too is a veteran.8 6
79. Chuck Gomez, Brooklyn Treatment Court: A Second Chance for Drug Offenders, HUFFINGTON
POST: THE BLOG (Apr. 22, 2013, 3:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chuck-gomez/brooklyn-
treatment-court_b_3053615.html [https://perma.cc/SK6F-PHCT].
80. See Russell, supra note 5, at 363 (quoting DEP'T OF DEE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, AN
ACHIEVABLE VisioN 41 (2007)), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location U2&doc GetTRDoc.
pdf&AD ADA469411 [https://perma.cc/H756-LF3C]).
81. See Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home: Accommodating the Special Needs of Military
Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 570 (2010) ("The veterans concept
adds an importantly tailored element: that those who have a shared experience, other veterans, offer the
most easily accepted and effective 'tough love' support."); Russell, supra note 5, at 364 ("Our
experience . . . is that veterans respond more favorably to other veterans in the court.").
82. Veterans Courts, supra note 60 ("Peer mentors are a critical component of the Veterans
Court/Track .... By virtue of their military experience, peer mentors provide veteran-defendants with a
unique source of support and motivation as they navigate through the court process.").
83. Steve Tillson, Veterans Court in Klamath County, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFE: S. OR. REHAB.
CTR. &CLINICS (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.southernoregon.va.gov/features/VeteransCourtIn_Klamath-
County.asp [https://perma.cc/L2ZA-V7HJ].
84. Mentors, BUFFALO VETERANS TREATMENT Ci., http://www.buffaloveteranscourt.org/mentors [https://
perma.cc/ T67A-UAY8].
85. See What Is a Veterans Treatment Court?, JUSTICE FOR VETS, http://justiceforvets.org/what-is-a-
veterans-treatment-court [https://perma.cc/5MMQ-E77H]; see also Meriwether, supra note 49 (noting
that the judge presiding over the Brooklyn Veterans Treatment Court is a veteran); John Sharp, Veterans
Courts Soaring in Demand as Teams of Volunteers Seek to Help Military Defendants, AL.com (Feb. 11,
2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.al.com/news/mobile/index.ssf/2015/02/veteranscourtssoaring insdem.
html [https://perma.cc/6YAE-KDL4] (noting the defense attorney assigned to the Baldwin County,
Alabama veterans court is a veteran); Veterans Court, PHILA. CTS. FIRST JUD. DISTRICT PA., http://www.
courts.phila.gov/veteranscourt/ [https://perma.cc/N47Q-WPRZ] [hereinafter Veterans Court, PA] (not-
ing that the judges who preside over the Philadelphia Municipal Veterans Court "are Veterans, and fully
aware of the burdens and the sacrifices these Veterans made").
86. See Meriwether, supra note 49.
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Like veterans courts, many girls courts strive to create a courtroom environ-
ment of mutual trust, respect, and understanding by staffing the court with
people with whom the offender can identify, in this case women. The Oahu and
Alameda County courts, for example, are staffed predominantly by women,
featuring female judges, court officers, and attorneys who are expected to act as
role models for the girls.8 7 Furthermore, in addition to traditional therapeutic
programming aimed at addressing addiction and mental health issues, girls
courts offer programs that aim to target what their creators have identified as
needs unique to girls, such as building self-esteem and inspiring trust and
respect in relationships with family members, other girls, and court personnel.
The mission of Dallas County's new E.S.T.E.E.M. (Experiencing Success
Through Empowerment, Encouragement and Mentoring) Court is to "provide
positive experiences" for the female participants to "foster success and empow-
erment and thereby prevent further involvement in the legal system." 8 And
Hawaii's court offers activities and services that provide girls with a "powerful
context ... to build relationship skills and maintain healthy relationships,"8 9
which have included group community service projects, mother-daughter re-
treats for participants and mother figures, and group activities such as surfing
lessons and art projects.90
II. REVEALING THE TROUBLING RELEASE OF PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE
As discussed in Part I, problem-solving courts are selective reforms that
parcel out opportunities and resources to particular offenders or, in the case of
accountability courts, particular victims. This increased funding for resources
and opportunities-for some-raises the specter of unequal access to a differ-
ent, and purportedly better, kind of justice for certain offenders or victims in a
system that claims to treat all equally.
Surprisingly, this selective distribution of access to resources, opportunities,
and perhaps alternatives to incarceration has not been met with abundant outcry.
To the contrary, many have hailed problem-solving courts as the most important
criminal justice system innovation of our time,91 with a fervor that has been
87. See Brown, supra note 58; see also About Us, supra note 53. The Santa Clara, California, court
originally followed the same model, but abandoned it due to logistical difficulties. See Carroll, supra
note 63 (noting the presiding judge "still believes that the treatment program is more effective with a
unified group of girls").
88. See Presentation, Children at Risk, Policy Lunch: Innovative Juvenile Specialty Courts (June 26,
2013), http://childrenatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/June-26th-CLE.ppt [https://perma.cc/VQ4
U-QXDT].
89. About Us, supra note 53 ("[G]roup activities promote team-building and positive personal
growth as well as help the girls develop decision making and self-confidence skills.").
90. Activities, HAw. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/activities.htnl [https://perma.cc/DN43-84
4G].
91. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Keynote Address, Problem-Solving Courts, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1925, 1925 (2002) (identifying problem-solving courts as "by far the most exciting, most promising
recent development in the law").
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compared to evangelism.92 Although the problem-solving court enterprise has
been subjected to increasing scholarly critique,9 3 no one has yet questioned the
distributive equity of the problem-solving court model itself.
The absence of this particular critique likely emanates, in large part, from
problem-solving courts purportedly reducing pressure on the overburdened
criminal justice system. In other words, they appear to be release valves that
effectively direct scarce resources to recurring systemic issues.
This appearance of efficacy rests on two popular presumptions about problem-
solving courts. First, on the front end, problem-solving courts purport to employ
evidence-based practices to select whom to include in these nonegalitarian
reform efforts. Data-not value judgments-are said to determine who will
benefit from these reforms. Mary D. Fan, for example, identifies problem-
solving courts as an example of "rehabilitation pragmatism," which she lauds
for using data-driven practices to select "beneficiaries," and for being "cautious
and selective" and attentive to efficacy.94
Second, on the back end, proponents promise that such courts provide
measurable systemic benefits. Since the creation of the first drug court in 1989,
problem-solving justice proponents have heralded specialized courts as an
effective, cost-saving alternative to the conventional system.95 Though many
proponents also laud problem-solving courts for reviving the rehabilitative ideal
of the criminal justice system,96 the rehabilitation problem-solving courts ad-
vance is not the traditional "egalitarian" rehabilitative ideal that strives to
"recl[aim] ... every soul." 97 Even when problem-solving courts invest re-
sources in rehabilitative opportunities for certain offenders, it is for the ultimate
purpose of making the system run more efficiently-successful rehabilitation is
said to reduce recidivism, which leads to increased safety and cost-savings. In
other words, problem-solving courts promote a utilitarian rehabilitation or
"neorehabilitation" that invests in rehabilitative programs for the sake of the
92. See NOLAN, supra note 1, at 137-39.
93. See, e.g., Boldt, supra note 4; Quinn, supra note 4, at 50-52 (highlighting how the nonadver-
sarial, team-based approach embraced by drug courts may conflict with a defense attorney's ethical
duty to zealously represent her client); see also McLeod, supra note 1, at 1591 ("[I]n their currently
predominant institutional forms, specialized criminal courts threaten to produce a range of unintended
and undesirable outcomes: unnecessarily expanding criminal surveillance, diminishing procedural
protections, and potentially even increasing incarceration.").
94. Fan, supra note 18, at 633-34.
95. Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts and Pragmatism, 73 MD. L. REV. 1120, 1127 (2014)
("The driving force behind the problem-solving courts movement from its inception has been an
express commitment to efficacy."); see also Candace McCoy, Commentary, The Politics of Problem-
Solving: An Overview of the Origins and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1513, 1517-18 (2003) (noting that early problem-solving court proponents, concerned primarily with
managing the overwhelming number of cases funneled into the system as a byproduct of the war on
drugs, emphasized the "essentially utilitarian," cost-cutting potential of the problem-solving court
model); Quinn, supra note 1, at 63 (discussing the utilitarian motivations of the first drug court).
96. McCoy, supra note 95, at 1521-23 (discussing the rise of therapeutic rationales for problem-
solving courts).
97. Fan, supra note 18, at 634.
2017] 1499
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL
system, not the offender.9 8 Tellingly, problem-solving courts have recently
become popular among conservative reformers focused on reducing the fiscal
strain on the criminal justice system and a pillar of the "Right on Crime"
agenda.99
As the following analysis reveals, status courts disrupt the narrative of
empiricism and efficiency that inspires and legitimates the problem-solving
court movement. These disruptions present cause for concern, which is explored
below. At the same time, they reveal the true promise of status courts, which
will be uncovered in Part III.
A. STATUS COURTS AND MORAL SORTING
In justifying status courts' selection mechanisms, proponents invoke a dis-
course of difference, insisting that status courts are necessary to serve the
"unique needs" of particular status groups. Although these courts serve dramati-
cally different populations, the needs of both groups are said to result from the
residual influence of traumatic experiences that often accompanies group mem-
bership. However, as the following discussion demonstrates, the latent and
possibly criminogenic impact of past traumatic experiences is a condition that
connects girls and veterans to, rather than separates them from, other offenders.
What really distinguishes these offenders from others is not the impact of
trauma per se, but rather a judgment that the criminal justice system should
account for the impact of trauma upon certain populations because they are
more deserving of such treatment. In other words, as this section contends, the
sorting in which status courts engage is moral, not empirical.
Veterans court proponents stress that veterans' unique needs stem from the
latent and potentially criminogenic effects of military service. They emphasize
the link between military service and emotional and psychological trauma,
specifically the staggering rates of traumatic brain injury and posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) among veterans who have served in combat. 00 This
trauma, in turn, imposes "costs," including substance addiction, mental illness,
98. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Neorehabilitation and Indiana's Sentencing Reform Dilemma, 47 VAL.
U. L. REv. 867, 874-75 (2013) (identifying drug courts as an example of neorehabilitation because they
are concerned with identifying and managing offenders "for the benefit of society, not the individual");
see also Miller, supra note 8, at 441 (describing neorehabilitation).
99. See, e.g., Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Prison Reform: A Smart Way for States to Save Money
and Lives, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/201 1/01/
06/AR2011010604386.html [https://perma.cc/3WYG-YFGS] (identifying drug courts as a positive
criminal justice reform measure); Rick Perry, America Needs to Stop Jailing So Many Non-Violent
Offenders, FEDERALIST (Apr. 1, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/04/01/america-needs-to-stop-jailing-
so-many-non-violent-offenders [https://perma.cc/YX66-2U58] (hailing Texas's drug courts as an ex-
ample of the "forward-thinking policy making" that prompted him to join Right on Crime). See
generally David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 99 IowA L. REV. 1473, 1509 (2014)
(discussing the "coalition between conservatives and liberals in support of problem-solving courts").
100. See, e.g., Cartwright, supra note 59, at 299; Jeremiah M. Glassford, Note, "In War There Are
No Unwounded Soldiers": The Emergence of Veterans Treatment Courts in Alabama, 65 ALA. L. REV.
239, 243-47 (2013).
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homelessness, and unemployment, which then lead to criminal behavior. o
That many veterans experience PTSD and that PTSD can be criminogenic are
both accurate observations. Estimates of the rate of PTSD among veterans reach
as high as thirty-five percent. 102 Furthermore, studies demonstrate that people
with PTSD are "significantly more likely" to be arrested, serve time in jail or
prison, and be charged with a violent offense. 103 One reason for this connection
is that those who experience PTSD may exhibit "chronic hyperarousal"-a
"distorted sense of always being under extreme threat" that can result in
"increased aggression and violent behavior." 104
Recent data, however, show that other populations experience PTSD at an
even higher rate than military veterans. Exposure to violence in one's commu-
nity, like exposure to violence in military combat, can cause trauma that results
in PTSD.1 0 5 People who live in low-income urban neighborhoods are at a high
risk for exposure to community violence. 106 A 2011 study found that forty-three
percent of the patients examined at Chicago's Cook County Hospital displayed
symptoms of PTSD,1 0 7 higher than even the highest estimates for veterans.
Interviews of inner-city residents in Atlanta, Georgia revealed "rates of
PTSD ... as high or higher than Iraq, Afghanistan or Vietnam veterans." 08 And
another recent study found that "[y]outh living in inner cities show a higher
101. See Russell, supra note 5, at 358-61; see also Veterans Treatment Court Act, No. 139, § 1, 2010
Colo. Sess. Laws 464, 464 (referencing studies demonstrating that "combat service may exact a
tremendous psychological toll on members of the military" and concluding that "[s]uch combat-related
injuries, including the use of drugs and alcohol to cope with such injuries, can lead to encounters with
the criminal justice system").
102. See Iraq Troops' PTSD Rate as High as 35 Percent, Analysis Finds, SCIENCEDAILY (Sept. 15,
2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/09/090914151629.htm [https://perma.cc/G6A7-J3
MU]. A study conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2008 found approximately twenty percent of all
veterans who returned from Iraq and Afghanistan reported symptoms of PTSD or major depression. See
One in Five Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Suffer from PTSD or Major Depression, RAND CORP. (Apr.
17, 2008), http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/04/17.html [https://perma.cc/3HJG-EKDR]. A study
conducted by the Veterans Administration found that nearly thirty percent of those treated at a VA
facility since September 11, 2001, had been diagnosed with PTSD. See Jamie Reno, Nearly 30% of Vets
Treated by VA. Have PTSD, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 21, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2012/10/21/nearly-30-of-vets-treated-by-v-a-have-ptsd.html [https://perma.cc/B729-AW5C].
103. Sachiko Donley et al., Civilian PTSD Symptoms and Risk for Involvement in the Criminal
Justice System, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 522, 524-25 (2012).
104. Lois Beckett, The PTSD Crisis That's Being Ignored: Americans Wounded in Their Own
Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 3, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-ptsd-crisis-
thats-being-ignored-americans-wounded-in-their-own-neighbor [https://perma.cc/4ZGD-T3QN]. As a
result of this sense of imminent threat, PTSD sufferers are more likely to carry a weapon to "restore
feelings of safety." Id.
105. See Community Violence: The Effects on Children and Teens, NAT'L CTR. FOR PTSD, http://www.
ptsd.va.gov/public/types/violence/effects-community-violence-children.asp [https://perma.cc/WJ42-EF
V7].
106. See id.
107. Beckett, supra note 104.
108. Id. (quoting Dr. Kerry Ressler, lead investigator of the research project).
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prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder than soldiers."1 09 The trauma re-
sults from exposure to community violence; in fact, it may be more difficult to
address the effects of PTSD for inner-city residents than veterans. Repeated
exposure to traumatic experiences increases the likelihood of developing
PTSD. 1 o In contrast to the experience of many veterans, whose exposure to
combat trauma ends with their tour of duty, for inner-city youth there may be no
delineated end to their exposure to trauma.1
The foundational claims about the uniqueness of girls' needs similarly ob-
scures a point of connection between them and those who are "sorted out" of
these courts-boys. 1 12 An organizing principle of girls courts is that girls follow
"fundamentally different" pathways to delinquency than boys. 11 3 The distinguish-
ing factor many proponents invoke is that many girls have experienced past
trauma-particularly sexual and physical abuse-and that this trauma contrib-
utes to their criminality.1 1 4 Toward that end, girls courts, like all gender-
responsive juvenile justice reform efforts, seek to provide "[t]rauma-informed
services" that respond to the traumatic impact of physical and sexual abuse
against girls and young women.1 1 5 For example, the Alameda County Girls'
Court dedicates itself to the creation of a "trauma-informed courtroom" that
focuses on "addressing the trauma, healing, and empowerment of young
women." 1 1 6 Trauma-informed service providers aim to "be aware of consumers'
history of past abuse, to understand the role that abuse plays in victims' lives,
109. Inner-City Oakland Youth Suffering From Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, CBS S.F. BAY AREA
(May 16, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/05/16/hood-disease-inner-city-oakland-
youth- suffering-from-post-traumatic-stres s-disorder-ptsd-crime-violence- shooting-homicide-murder/
[https://perma.ccl3SSB-BTJK] (quoting testimony of Howard Spivak, M.D., director of the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Division of Violence Prevention, at an April 2012
congressional briefing).
110. Naomi Breslau et al., Previous Exposure to Trauma and PTSD Effects of Subsequent Trauma:
Results from the Detroit Area Survey of Trauma, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 902, 906 (1999).
111. See Inner-City Oakland Youth Suffering From Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, supra note 109.
112. An analysis of the theoretical soundness of gender-responsive programming is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a critique of the theoretical underpinnings of gender-responsive programming,
see generally Sara Goodkind, Gender-Specific Services in the Juvenile Justice System: A Critical
Examination, 20 AFFLIA 52 (2005).
113. See supra Section I.C.
114. For example, a juvenile deliquency administrative judge in Hillsborough County, Florida,
explained that a girls court was necessary because girls end up in the juvenile system because of sexual
abuse, coercion from an older boy, or "because of some trauma in their past that no one really wants to
scratch the surface of." See Sue Carlton, Court for Girls? It's a Start, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 24, 2015,
5:52 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/court-for-girls-its-a-start/2238656 [https://perma.cc/
7V4K-KFKC].
115. See Dana Jones Hubbard & Betsy Matthews, Reconciling the Diferences Between the "Gender-
Responsive" and the "What Works" Literatures to Improve Services for Girls, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 225,
238-39 (2008).
116. Juvenile Services, ALAMEDA COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/defender/
services/juvenile.htm#juvl4 [https://perma.cc/9C2E-DJQ5] (last visited Feb. 8, 2016) (describing the
mission of the Alameda County Girls' Court); see also About Us, HAw. GIRLS CT., supra note 53
(quoting the Girls Court's presiding judge who says the court provides "trauma-informed care to girls
and their families").
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and to use this understanding to create services that facilitate their participation
in treatment." 1 7
As with the link between PTSD and criminal behavior, it is undeniable that
sexual and physical abuse can be criminogenic. In response to concerns over the
increase in arrest rates for female juveniles, the Department of Justice's Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention convened the Girls Study
Group in 2008 to gain insight into, inter alia, the causes of delinquency in
girls.'" While the group found that some delinquency risk factors are "gender
sensitive," importantly, it found that "girls and boys experience many of the
same delinquency risk factors." 9 Crucially, the group found that all types of
maltreatment-sexual, physical, and neglect-increase the risk of delinquency
in all juveniles. 12 0 In other words, the experience of sexual victimization may
contribute to delinquency for both boys and girls. Although sexual victimization
is more common among girls, 12 1 that sexual victimization contributes to delin-
quency is not "unique" to them. 12 2 Moreover, although many girls who come
into contact with the juvenile justice system have been subjected to sexual
abuse, undoubtedly not all have. The use of gender as a proxy for sexual
victimization, therefore, is both under- and overinclusive.
117. Hubbard & Matthews, supra note 115, at 238-39. See generally Stephanie S. Covington,
Women and Addiction: A Trauma-Informed Approach, 40 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 377, 380-82 (2008)
(describing how treatment providers can become "trauma informed").
118. See Margaret A. Zahn et al., The Girls Study Group-Charting the Way to Delinquency
Prevention for Girls, THE GIRLS STUDY GROUP SERIES (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency
Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.C.), Oct. 2008, at 1-2, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/22343
4.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY3B-ZT52].
119. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 4. The Group also found that the child's neighborhood and family dynamics, the
availability of community-based programs, the extent of involvement in school, and the influence of a
romantic partner who commits "serious crimes" predict delinquency in both male and female offenders.
Id. The factors that more strongly influence a girl's risk of delinquency are early puberty, depression
and anxiety, and the influence of a romantic partner who engages in low-level offenses. Id.
121. See Margaret A. Zahn et al., Causes and Correlates of Girls' Delinquency, THE GIRLS GROUP
SERIES (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice), Oct. 2010, at3,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/226358.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAH6-28QC].
122. For further analysis of the similarity of risk factors between boys and girls, see Charlene Taylor,
Girls and Boys, Apples and Oranges? A Theoretically Informed Analysis of Gender-Specific Predictors
of Delinquency 112 (July 21, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cincinnati), http://cech.
uc.edu/content/dam/cech/programs/criminaljustice/Docs/Dissertations/taylor-kindrickC.pdf [https://perma.
cc/32YX-RH5U] (refuting the assumption that "the criminogenic needs of females significantly differ
from those of males" and finding "general risk factors prove to be as predictive for girls as they are for
boys" and "some of the purported female specific risk predictors are significantly related to male
delinquency as well").
This observation of the causes of delinquency in male and female juveniles does not undermine the
validity of the observation that the juvenile justice system has historically responded differently to
delinquency in girls than in boys. See generally Cynthia Godsoe, Contempt, Status, and the Criminaliza-
tion of Non-Conforming Girls, 35 CARDOZO L. REv. 1091 (2014) (describing how the juvenile status
offender system is used disproportionately to regulate the conduct of girls).
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Thus, the experience of trauma-and its potentially criminogenic influence-
is hardly unique to veterans or girls. 12 3 By invoking a discourse of difference,
however, status court proponents avoid having to grapple with the difficult and
unavoidable conclusion that a history of trauma is one that unites veterans and
girls with, rather than separates them from, other offenders.'2 For example,
veterans court proponents insist that the trauma experienced by veterans is
qualitatively different than that experienced by civilians. 12 5
Once the veil of uniqueness is lifted, the only remaining justification for the
separation of these populations into different courts is that these offenders
deserve different-and better-treatment than others. Veterans court proponents
routinely insist that instead of being "churned through the courts like any
common criminal," veterans "need and deserve something much better."1 2 6
Girls court proponents make similar claims, albeit less directly, by insisting that
girls are different from boys and require a more empathetic, relational court
experience than boys do. 12 7 But it is undeniable that the process girls courts
promise, one that values trust, respect, and empowerment, is qualitatively better
than the conventional juvenile justice system.
That status courts embody a judgment about moral desert of these offenders
is underscored by the intragroup sorting that occurs within status courts. Despite
the broad rhetoric about the universal needs of veterans and girls, some of these
courts restrict access to only a segment of these status group populations. Most
veterans courts, for example, preclude those who were dishonorably discharged
123. Deborah Weissman has highlighted similarities between veteran offenders and another offender
population: those who are chronically under- or unemployed. See generally Deborah M. Weissman,
Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of Domestic Violence, 20 DuKE J. GENDER L. &
PoL'Y 221, 247-48 (2013) (underscoring the similarities between the emotional and psychological
repercussions of combat and chronic economic instability).
124. In this way, the sorting that occurs in status courts is similar to the "death is different" rationale
of death penalty law, which the Supreme Court invokes to justify giving death penalty defendants
additional procedural protections. As Rachel Barkow highlights, this rationale creates a two-track
system that allows the Court to focus myopically on the importance of procedures for death-eligible
defendants without having to grapple with the more difficult question of whether it should extend such
protections to the rest-and overwhelming majority-of criminal defendants who do not face the death
penalty. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1189 (2009).
125. For example, in explaining the impetus behind the opening of his state's first veterans court in
2012, Mississippi Circuit Judge Robert Krebs asserted: "[Veterans] have PTSD. They've seen death,
dying, dismembered body parts, blood. It's a totally different experience than the street." Veterans
Court Addresses Special Needs, supra note 60; see also Erinn Gansel, Note, Military Service-Related
PTSD and the Criminal Justice System: Treatment As an Alternative to Incarceration, 23 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 147, 156 (2014) (acknowledging that civilians also experience PTSD but arguing that
"veterans are a special class that needs extra protection").
126. Craig Logsdon & Michelle Keogh, Uncommon Criminals: Why Veterans Need Their Own
Court, 47 ARIZ. AT'Y14, 24 (2010) (emphasis added).
127. See supra Section I.C. This approach embodies a cultural feminist understanding of inherent
gender difference, which itself has been subjected to much criticism. See FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN
ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER 10-12 (Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003).
1504 [Vol. 105:1481
STATUS COURTS
from participating. 128 This restriction "reflects the sense that participants de-
serve the help provided in the treatment court because of their honorable
service."1 2 9
In sum, status courts are concerned with funneling resources not only, or even
primarily, to where they can be most effective but rather to where they are most
deserved. This-the sorting of offenders for rehabilitative opportunities based
on a judgment about morality-represents a true paradigm shift. The criminal
law supposedly responds to the offense and is not concerned with making moral
judgments about the worth of the offender. 13 0
Thus, status courts use a discourse of difference and empiricism as a cover
for moral judgment. In some ways the moral sorting dynamic at play in status
courts is not new at all; rather, it is simply an exaggerated and more explicit
version of what occurs with all problem-solving interventions. Judge Judith
Kaye, former chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals and ardent
supporter of problem-solving courts, noted: "Courts are ... a mirror of soci-
ety." 1 3 1 In making that observation, Chief Judge Kaye noted that the criminal
court docket reflects what transpires in a community. But criminal courts,
generally, and problem-solving courts, particularly, mirror society in a less
literal way: who and what we choose to target sends a message about who and
what we value and who is worth rehabilitating.
From this perspective, it is possible to see instances of moral sorting at play
in earlier generations of problem-solving courts. For example, treatment court
proponents employ broad rhetoric about the criminogenic influence of drug
addiction or mental illness and the need for treatment instead of incarceration to
close the revolving door to the criminal justice system. 13 2 If in fact these courts
were driven primarily by data, not moral judgment, they would prioritize
participation of those offenders with the highest need for rehabilitative interven-
128. See Cartwright, supra note 59, at 306. But see Chelsea Jensen, A Second Chance for Vets, W.
HAw. TODAY (Feb. 20, 2014, 1:02 AM), http://westhawaiitoday.com/news/local-news/second-chance-vets#
sthash.cWS0mLOA.dpuf [https://perma.cc/QJ8Z-GQRQ] (noting that the Oahu Veterans Treatment
Court is open to "honorably and less-than-honorably discharged" veterans).
129. Cartwright, supra note 59, at 306.
130. See, e.g., Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017) (identifying as a "basic premise of our
criminal justice system" that "[o]ur law punishes people for what they do, not who they are"); Nicola
Lacey & Hanna Pickard, From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? Taking the Clinical Model of
Responsibility Without Blame Into the Legal Realm, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (2013) ("Judge-
ment of the conduct for which an offender is responsible is the business of the criminal process."); see
also Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law's Social Meanings, 97
VA. L. REV. 1267, 1311 (2011) ("Imprisoning persons for murder, rape, and robbery, and branding
them felons, no doubt expresses a view about the inferiority of the conduct in which murderers, rapists,
and robbers engage, without thereby expressing a view about the inherent moral worth of the
perpetrators.").
131. Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & PoL'Y
REV. 125, 129 (2004).
132. See supra Section I.A.
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tion.1 3 3 Instead, treatment courts employ preliminary selection criteria that
focus not on an individual's particular need for rehabilitative services but rather
on their perceived risk for recidivism. 13 4 Under a risk analysis, those who stand
to benefit the most from rehabilitative interventions are often deemed too risky
to participate, and are thus funneled into the conventional system. Low-risk
offenders, on the other hand, are "cherry picked" for problem-solving court
participation. 13 5 Judge Morris Hoffman has characterized this as a form of
".reverse moral screening": "[T]hose defendants who do not respond to treat-
ment, and therefore may be the most diseased, go to prison, while those
defendants who respond well and whose use of drugs truly may have been
voluntary, escape prison."1 36
This sorting out of offenders who stand to benefit the most from rehabilitative
interventions is troubling not only because it is counterintuitive but also because
it has a racially disparate impact. Although race cannot be and is not used
directly as a risk factor, 13 7 many risk indicators have the impact of sorting out
racial minorities, particularly black men. 138 For example, prior criminal history
plays an outsized role in the assessment of risk, with most problem-solving
courts prohibiting participation for those with an established criminal record. 13 9
Yet black communities and other communities of color are often disproportion-
ately surveilled by the police and, consequently, their members are more likely
133. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. Rev. 189, 211 (2013) (discussing
empirical studies showing that "the most risky offenders benefit most from rehabilitative treatment").
134. For example, in New York City, prosecutors decide whether to offer a plea that includes drug
court participation in the first instance. See Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 783, 798 (2008); Quinn, supra note 4, at 57. They base this determination upon the defendant's
"current charges and past record, not on his therapeutic need or lack thereof." Bowers, supra, at 798.
135. Josh Bowers makes the counterintuitive observation that "notwithstanding the supposed first-
order drug-court aim to stop the cycle of addiction and incarceration among recidivist addicted drug
users, the profile of the typical New York City defendant who received a drug-court offer was
something else entirely-a clean-record dealer." Bowers, supra note 134, at 799.
136. Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1437, 1476
(2000).
137. Eaglin, supra note 133, at 215 ("While predictive tools explicitly used race as a risk factor as
late as 1979, this factor disappeared due to constitutional infirmity." (footnote omitted)).
138. See NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURrs: THE CRIMINAL
COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 13 (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadA
sset.aspx?id=20217&libID=20187 [https://perma.cc/66LB-769U] ("Too often it seems that drug court
eligibility and admission criteria serve to exclude mostly indigent and minority defendants."); see also
Jaros, supra note 99, at 1513 (observing that problem-solving court screening requirements may
"disproportionately prevent minority defendants from participating in problem-solving courts, leaving
them subject to the incarcerative penalties that are issued in conventional courts"). Studies also suggest
that these same populations are more likely to fail out of problem-solving court programs. See Bowers,
supra note 134, at 803-05.
139. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1554-55 (2004) (discussing eligibility criteria for drug courts in
Florida and California). See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING,
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (discussing significance of criminal history in criminal
justice risk assessment).
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to have a criminal record. 140 This criminal history will then prevent them from
participating in many problem-solving courts. 141
A morality tale can also be told about all accountability courts. The organiz-
ing principle of these courts is that offenders of certain crimes are not being
held accountable. But another way of stating this principle is that certain
victims, such as business owners or domestic violence victims, deserve more
services and protection than others. Tellingly, the nation's first community court
opened to appease the complaints of business owners around New York City's
Times Square about the scourge of prostitution and the effect of other low-level
street crime on their businesses. 14 2 The point is not that these courts incorrectly
identify that the criminal justice system's response to certain types of offenders
or victims is wanting. Instead, it is simply to highlight that these courts result
from a choice to target certain offenses and victims for selective justice and not
others. These choices, in turn, embody a judgment about which communities
deserve more justice than they currently receive in the conventional system.
Why these courts and not a court that seeks to increase accountability for
victims of police violence or harassment? Or for victims of corporate fraud?
Nevertheless, invocation of actuarial rhetoric and the prevailing presumption
that problem-solving courts are "atheoretical" innovations guided only by a
"what works" philosophy obscures these choices and discourages these
questions. 14 3
B. THE EXPRESSIVE RELEASE OF STATUS COURTS
Release-valve reforms, like back-end sentence reduction programs, tend to be
shortsighted emergency measures that are implemented to provide immediate
140. See Bowers, supra note 134, at 806 (noting that "poor and/or minority communities are
disproportionate foci of police enforcement"). See generally Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.YU. L. REv. 956, 987-91 (1999) (describing the
effect of stereotypic judgments and biases on police officers' perceptions of whether an individual's
behavior warrants police interaction).
141. This phenomenon is well documented in the drug court context. For example, a study of drug
courts in California revealed that white offenders were admitted at rates disproportionate to their
representation in the population of individuals arrested for drug crimes. See NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL
DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 138, at 42. A review of Pima County, Arizona's drug court revealed no
African-American participants and a dramatic underrepresentation of Hispanic participants. See id. at
42. And a drug court judge in Chelsea, Massachusetts, candidly noted that the population of her court
did not reflect the "culturally diverse population" of the community; her court had not served a single
African-American defendant for about six months. See Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-
Solving Courts, 21 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 27, 45 (2009).
142. See Mae C. Quinn, Revisiting Anna Moscowitz Kross's Critique of New York City's Women's
Court: The Continued Problem of Solving the "Problem" of Prostitution with Specialized Criminal
Courts, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 665, 698 (2006).
143. See Boldt, supra note 95, at 1132 (noting the presumption that problem-solving courts are
"atheoretical" innovations and that this atheoretical discourse obscures "the range of choices associated
with the identification of relevant problems and acceptable solutions"). Pragmatism is itself a philoso-
phy, and Richard Boldt recently argued that a robust application of this theory could help make
problem-solving courts more effective and coherent. See id. at 1147-71.
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fiscal relief and enacted without careful consideration of their long-term conse-
quences. 14 4 Problem-solving courts are arguably different: they aim to reduce
reliance on the criminal justice system in the long term, even if reaching that
goal requires additional investment in the short term. Unlike emergency sentenc-
ing reductions or other release-valve reform efforts, which are envisioned as
delimited reforms that enable the system to persist until sufficient pressure has
been released (for example, until prison populations decline to a more sustain-
able rate), problem-solving courts are designed as permanent reforms that will
perpetually relieve pressure on the criminal justice system. Because of this
extended orientation, Mary D. Fan, who otherwise cautions of the dangers of
release-valve reform efforts, identifies drug and veterans courts as "bright
spots" on an otherwise bleak landscape of "budget-cut criminal justice."1 4 5 This
section highlights an unaccounted for consequence that dims the promise of
problem-solving courts: they may actually disincentivize long-term, systemic
reform.
Precisely because problem-solving courts are intended to be permanent,
institutionalized release valves, they help the broken system continue to operate
in perpetuity despite its flaws. 14 6 By purporting to remove from the conven-
tional system populations that dramatically highlight its dysfunction and ineffi-
ciencies, problem-solving courts relieve the stress of the greatest systemic
failings. This observation provides reason to be concerned with all problem-
solving courts-they may release just enough pressure so that a system that by
all accounts is broken1 4 7 does not explode.
But, as this section argues, there is reason to be particularly concerned with
the release status courts provide. Setting aside, momentarily, critiques of fiscally
driven neoliberal reform measures, 14 8 both treatment and accountability courts
purport to address the tangible costs of doing business in an overburdened
system.
Although problem-solving justice often is more expensive than conventional
approaches, 14 9 it has gained widespread popularity with scholars, judges, and
144. See Fan, supra note 18, at 621-23.
145. Id. at 584.
146. See generally Robert Weisberg, Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the MPCS, 61 FLA. L. REV.
797, 804 (2009) ("Regimes of alternative sanctions often end up simply widening the net of criminal
supervision and feeding more people into prisons; they serve not as replacements for prisons, but as
pressure-release valves to enable the state to retain large prison censuses." (citing FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
& GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 185-86 (1991))).
147. See Boldt, supra note 95, at 1128-29 (describing how, according to "virtually any reasonable
set of criteria, the traditional criminal court system is a failure").
148. See infra Section III.A.
149. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABLITY OFFICE, GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE
INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES 71 (2005), http://www.gao.
gov/assets/250/245452.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5FM-NQD8] (finding that the operational costs of seven
drug court programs exceeded that of traditional case processing by $750 to $8,500 per participant);
Community Court Research: A Literature Review, CTR. FOR CT INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.
org/research/community-court-research-literature-review-0 [https://perma.cc/CG3Q-8TA2](citing study
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politicians across the political spectrum who believe this upfront investment
will pay off with back-end results-namely, reduced recidivism rates and
incarceration costs. 1 5 0 Although some offenders or victims may receive extra
resources or access more attractive opportunities, the investment is intended to
improve the system's functioning for the system's sake.1 5' Treatment courts, for
example, appear to address the efficiency costs of the conventional system. 15 2
They remove from the assembly line of justice those whose criminogenic
circumstances reformers believe can be controlled through treatment and rehabili-
tative services. Instead of simply punishing and releasing offenders who will
inevitably return through the "revolving door" of the criminal justice system,
they purport to eliminate the root cause of criminal behavior, thereby reducing
recidivism that, in turn, may reduce future operating costs. Accountability
courts, by contrast, seek to address the cost of errors-the deficiency costs-by
targeting offenses that would otherwise escape sanction because the system is
overtaxed. 15 3 They sweep in not only those offenses that are so severe, like
domestic violence and sex offenses, that they require more attention than is
provided in the conventional system, but also those low-level, quality-of-life
offenses that the overburdened conventional system has been letting go.
Whether accountability and treatment courts actually make good on their
promise to help the system function more efficiently remains the subject of
much debate. 15 4 But on a discursive level, if not in practice, their organizational
principles resonate with the utilitarian reasoning that prompted1 5 5 and continue
to legitimize the problem-solving court movement.
Unlike treatment and accountability courts, the primary aim of status courts is
not to make the system run more efficiently. 156 Instead, they seek to provide
certain offenders with a more respectful, thoughtful process-even if doing so
does not result in quantifiably improved outcomes. In other words, they seek to
improve the system for the offender's sake. Former Attorney General Eric
Holder admitted as much when he said that the creation of veterans courts was
finding that the community court in Hennepin County, Minnesota, spent approximately $704 more per
case than traditional courts).
150. See, e.g., BERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 13 (claiming that the "up-front investment in
problem-solving justice reaps significant dividends on the back end"); Fan, supra note 18, at 641
(arguing that drug courts "save taxpayers money in the long run despite potentially higher start-up
costs"). See generally Jaros, supra note 99, at 1509 (discussing the "coalition between conservatives
and liberals in support of problem-solving courts").
151. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. For this reason, problem-solving courts have
been characterized as an example of "neorehabilitation." See Eaglin, supra note 98, at 874-75.
152. See supra Section I.A.
153. See supra Section I.B.
154. See infra Section III.D (discussing disagreement over whether problem-solving courts actually
reduce operating costs).
155. See McCoy, supra note 95, at 1517-18.
156. See supra Section I.C.
2017] 1509
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL
"morally the right thing to do," regardless of their impact on recidivism rates.
Thus, they address a more elusive cost: they relieve the toll on our sense of
morality of subjecting sympathetic populations to the indignities of the imper-
sonal assembly line of the overburdened, conventional criminal justice system.
That status courts change the tenor of the court process is not inherently
problematic. In fact, as I discuss in Part III, the way these courts respond to
offenders reflects a reimagination of the criminal offender identity that should
be a guide for future criminal justice reforms. The problem, rather, is that
reimagining only incredibly sympathetic populations-and through a discourse
of difference that obscures the connection between status court offenders and
others-may counterintuitively disincentivize widespread systemic reform.
By directing resources to members of certain status groups through a rhetoric
of desert, status courts not only convey that we are dedicating rehabilitative
resources to the "right" people, but they also justify leaving those sorted
out-the "wrong" people-to the conventional system.
For example, veterans court proponents routinely invoke the image of an
otherwise honorable veteran being subjected to "business as usual" and churned
through the impersonal court system in support of their contention that these
offenders belong in a court that treats them with more respect and individual-
ized attention.1 5" This argument has a compelling rhetorical impact: the image
of a down-on-his-luck veteran being treated as another face in the criminal court
crowd draws sympathy, but subjecting a nonveteran to the same impersonal
process does not. But therein lies the problem: this line of reasoning leads to the
conclusion that veterans-but not others-are entitled to a different kind of
criminal justice process. Veterans court proponents exacerbate this dynamic by
asserting that the courts provide veterans with the support they have "earned"
through national service. 159 A veterans court in Brooklyn, for example, awards
157. See Ari Melber, For Vets, Rehab Rather than Prison, MSNBC (Jan. 29, 2014, 5:30 PM),
http://www.msnbc.com/the-cycle/vets-rehab-rather-prison [https://perma.cc/U3NB-EC9Z].
158. What Is a Veterans Treatment Court?, supra note 85 (describing veterans courts as an
alternative to the "business as usual" approach of "having all veterans appear before random judges
who may or may not have an understanding of their unique problems").
159. See About Us, JUSTICE FOR VETS, http://justiceforvets.org/about [https://perma.cc/B4CQ-VY9B]
(stating that the Veterans Treatment Court movement "keep[s] veterans out of jail and connect[s] them
to the benefits and treatment they have earned"); R. Gil Kerlikowske, Veterans Treatment Courts:
Providing Our Nation's Heroes the Support They Have Earned, WHITE HOUSE (June 1, 2012, 4:45 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/01/veterans-treatment-courts-providing-our-nations-heroes-
support-they-have-earned [https://perma.cc/52BW-S6CA]; Elliot Blair Smith, War Heroes Gone Bad
Divided by Courts Favoring Prison or Healing, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 2012, 9:01 PM), http://bloomberg.
com/news/2012-11-02/war-heroes-gone-bad-divided-by-courts-favoring-prison-or-healing.html [https://
perma.cc/G5SY-DGMA] ("Veterans who have served their country and are not career criminals deserve
a therapeutic approach . . . ." (quoting Judge Vance Peterson, a state district judge with a veterans
docket)); see also Cartwright, supra note 59, at 303 ("Recent legislation in Colorado that will create
veterans treatment courts statewide explicitly finds that 'as a grateful state, we must continue to honor
the military service of our men and women by attempting to provide them with an alternative to
incarceration when feasible, permitting them instead to access proper treatment for mental health and
substance abuse problems resulting from military service."'); Veterans Court, PA, supra note 85 (stating
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defendants who are graduating from court programs a medallion that reads,
"I came with hope and worked and learned. I have a new life-a life that
I've earned." 1 6 0 An implicit corollary of this argument that defendants who
are veterans deserve better is that nonveterans-or the "common criminal" in
the parlance of some veterans court proponents1 6 '-have not earned the more
favorable treatment such courts provide, and therefore should be left to the
conventional system.
The reasoning for girls courts is less direct but equally troubling. A founda-
tional principle of girls courts is that male and female juveniles have distinct
needs and the traditional juvenile justice system was designed "for boys."1 6 2
Among the "Gender-Specific Programming for Girls" the Oahu court offers are
programs that provide emotional and physical safety, address abuse, are cultur-
ally competent, provide positive role models, and are strength- and relationship-
based. 16 3 And the "gender-responsive" values it seeks to advance include
"Healing," "Instilling Hope," and "Nurturing Strengths."1 6 4 It is difficult to
imagine how male juvenile offenders would not benefit from programs that
emphasize these values. Yet, by justifying the implementation of these programs
through a discourse of gender difference, the courts imply that only girls need
these specialized programs; because the traditional system was designed "for
boys," it already addresses their needs and need not be changed to accommo-
date them. Male offenders, it follows, do not require the empathetic, relational
treatment promoted in the girls court setting.
Thus, by conveying that offenders who do not belong to these status groups
do not require or deserve specialized treatment, status courts risk reifying old
ways of doing justice for non-status offenders, who comprise the majority of the
criminal offender population. Indeed, if non-status offenders deserve the dysfunc-
tional system, it follows that there is no need to change it.
This rhetorical distinction also has immediate and tangible consequences.
Problem-solving court involvement is a highly imperfect, though increasingly
popular, method of social service delivery.1 6 5 It cannot be a mere coincidence
that problem-solving courts began to gain widespread popularity in the 1990s at
the same moment that the welfare state was essentially dismantled through the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.166 Indeed, many
that the veterans treatment court "will witness a tremendous benefit to Veterans, as they overcome the
burden carried from service to our country, now exacerbated by involvement with the criminal justice
system").
160. Gomez, supra note 79.
161. E.g., Logsdon & Keogh, supra note 126, at 24.
162. See Girls Court, supra note 53.
163. Pamphlet, Family Court of the First Circuit, Hawaii Girls Court: Gender-Specific Programming
for Girls, http://www.girlscourt.org/GirlsCourtHawaii.pdf [https://perma.cc/59C2-NQXG].
164. Our Mission, supra note 51.
165. See supra Section I.A.
166. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
see Eaglin, supra note 133, at 203 ("[T]he disappearance of the welfare state and the social safety net
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court proponents point to the failures in social support systems as setting the
stage for the emergence of the problem-solving approach to criminal justice.
For example, Greg Berman and John Feinblatt have identified the breakdown of
"social and community institutions ... that have traditionally addressed prob-
lems like addiction, mental illness, quality-of-life crime, and domestic violence"
as one of the "forces" that "helped set the stage for problem-solving innova-
tion." 16 7 Problem-solving courts seek to fill this "void" by linking offenders or
victims who fall within their purview to otherwise unavailable supportive social
services. 168
Those who are sorted into problem-solving courts are afforded access to these
benefits-and in principle, if not in practice, 16 9 are frequently offered an
opportunity to avoid an incarceratory sentence-that are denied to those who
are sorted out. Many scholars have rightfully criticized this arrangement, suggest-
ing that the resources dedicated to problem-solving justice would be better
directed toward bolstering the social service infrastructure separate from the
criminal justice system.1 7 0 Even some problem-solving-court proponents note
that the provision of social services through court involvement is not "ideal,"
make the neorehabilitative model all the more intriguing to the public, policy makers, and the judiciary
because neorehabilitation potentially provides otherwise inaccessible services to overwhelmingly poor
subpopulations.").
167. Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 26, at 128; see also Arie Freiberg, Problem-Oriented Courts:
Innovative Solutions to Intractable Problems?, 11 J. JUD. ADMIN. 8, 9 (2001) (arguing that "a breakdown
in traditional social and community institutions which have supported individuals in the past" contrib-
uted to the need for problem-solving courts); James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts:
Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2003) (noting that the
legal system is called upon to address social ills "because of the failure of 'traditional nonlegal dispute
resolution mechanisms in society,' such as 'church, community, neighborhood, friends, and family"'
(quoting Professor Susan Daicoff)); Greg Berman, "What Is A Traditional Judge Anyway?": Problem
Solving in the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 80 (2000) (identifying the "breakdown of the family and
other traditional safety nets" as one of the "conditions" that brought about the problem-solving court
movement) (comments of Hon. Judith Kaye).
168. See Nolan, supra note 167, at 1541-42 (describing the argument that failures in the traditional
support systems left courts with "no choice but to step into the void"); see also Susan Stefan & Bruce J.
Winick, Foreword, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL Y & L. 507, 511 (2005)
(arguing that one way to frame "the problem that mental health courts are intended to solve" is to
compensate for "the lack of access to adequate community mental health services" (comments of Susan
Stefan)); Keegan Hamilton, Washington's New Juvenile Gang Court Program Already Lacks Funding,
SEATTLE WKLY. (Apr. 11, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.seattleweekly.com/dailyweekly/2012/04/juvenile
gangscourt lawlacksjfunding.php [https://perma.cc/VGM8-MGKH] ("We provide services that aren't
getting met . ... We make sure they're OK, their power is not shut off. We're providing for them and
meeting their needs. You ain't going to tell me to stop banging and selling drugs if my power is shut off
and there's not food on my table." (quoting a Washington juvenile gang court intervention specialist));
cf Berman, supra note 167, at 80 (arguing that the system looks to the judicial branch to "solve these
problems" because of "the abject failure of the other branches of government" (comments of Hon.
Truman Morrison)).
169. See infra Section III.D (discussing conflicting data about the efficacy of problem-solving
interventions and describing the ways in which problem-solving courts "widen the net" of judicial
involvement for those who appear before them).
170. See, e.g., Boldt, supra note 4, at 18-19; McCoy, supra note 95, at 1532-34; McLeod, supra
note 1, at 1631-44.
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but contend it is preferable to the conventional court system.1 7 1 In other words,
it is a second-best solution that attempts to compensate for, but does not
ameliorate, the systemic failings of the welfare state.
III. UNCOVERING THE TRUE PROMISE OF STATUS COURTS
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, there is reason for concern about the
development of status courts. This Part demonstrates that they also represent a
positive development in the evolution of criminal justice reform. By moving
away from a decontextualized understanding of individual responsibility and
toward an acknowledgment that external forces shape an individual's criminal
behavior, status courts reinvigorate components of the rehabilitative ideal that
may help lead the way out of our current carceral crisis.
A. THE RISE OF RETRIBUTIVISM AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 17 2
From the late-nineteenth century until the 1970s, the American criminal
justice system was characterized by the ideology of penal-welfarism, or the
notion that "penal measures ought, where possible, to be rehabilitative interven-
tions rather than negative, retributive punishments."1 7 3 This rehabilitative ideal
was the organizing principle that cemented the system together, providing the
"all-embracing conceptual net" within and through which the state responded to
criminal activity. 174
An essential tenet of the rehabilitative ideal was the notion that that the most
criminal offenders could and should be rehabilitated. 175 Offenders were seen as
psychologically complex individuals whose behavior required correction, but
who nonetheless maintained their place in mainstream society."7 In other
words, they were not irredeemable "others" but "innately human" individuals
171. For example, Bruce Winick has argued that a "humane society" would make mental health
treatment widely available and would provide better social services for those who require treatment,
and has conceded that mental health courts may not be the "best way of providing needed services or of
motivating people with mental illness to accept the treatment that they often refuse or cannot obtain
otherwise." Stefan & Winick, supra note 168, at 510 (comments of Bruce Winick). However, he
concludes that "given the realities of our mental health service delivery system-in which social and
medical problems that cannot otherwise be effectively dealt with tend to get dumped at the doorstep of
the courthouse," mental health courts are preferable to conventional courts for people with mental
illness. Id. at 511.
172. This is a rich topic, a detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this Article. For more
in-depth treatment, see generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).
173. GARLAND, supra note 172, at 34.
174. Id. at 35 (describing the rehabilitative ideal as "the hegemonic, organizing principle, the
intellectual framework and value system that bound together the whole structure").
175. Lynch, supra note 7, at 90 ("Very simply, underlying the prevailing penal philosophy of that
time was a conception of the offender/convict as a reformable being and the state as the appropriate
entity to engage in such reform."). As Lynch notes, the use of the death penalty during this period
reflected a belief that some offenders remained "beyond hope for redemption." Id. at 91.
176. See id. at 89-90.
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who needed to be understood and treated.1 7 7
Under this rehabilitative regime, responsibility for criminality was shared
between the offender and the state. David Garland notes that crime was per-
ceived "as a social problem that manifested itself in the form of individual,
criminal acts."17" A "fundamental axiom" of this ideological orientation was
that crime was the result of "poverty and deprivation," a symptom of failings of
the social welfare state. 179 Although individual rehabilitation was a necessary
component of the response to criminal behavior, the ultimate "cure" for this
problem required ameliorative state action, including the "expansion of prosper-
ity and the provision of social welfare."Iso
Beginning in the 1950s and building through the 1970s, the rehabilitative
orientation-particularly its manifestation in an indeterminate sentencing
scheme-fell into disfavor amongst liberal and conservative scholars alike. 8 A
concern that united scholars across the political spectrum was that the rehabilita-
tive ideal gave too little weight to the moral agency and responsibility of
criminal offenders, which diminished the rights and respect-and undermined
the appropriate punishment-that such agency demanded. 18 2
These bipartisan critiques, emerging in the context of a changing sociopoliti-
cal climate that was increasingly amenable to "tough on crime" policies,
contributed to a systemic reorientation of the criminal justice system toward a
retributive ideal. 18 3 This shift was intended to cure the unrestrained discretion of
the rehabilitative-focused system by recalibrating the penal system to administer
the level of punishment an individual's behavior mandated, regardless of the
offender's individual circumstances. 1 84
177. Id. at 89; see also GARLAND, supra note 172, at 130 ("[C]orrectional criminology took criminal
conduct to be a product of social influences and psychological conflicts .....
178. GARLAND, supra note 172, at 41 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 43 (noting also the attendant belief that "its cure ... lay in the expansion of prosperity
and the provision of social welfare"); see also Lacey & Pickard, supra note 130, at 6 (stating that "in its
purest, theoretical form," the rehabilitative ideal understood criminal conduct to be "a symptom of
some underlying individual or social pathology").
180. GARLAND, supra note 172, at 43.
181. See Kate Stith & Steve Y Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 227-28 (1993) (describing three
fundamental critiques of the rehabilitative ideal beginning in the 1950s). Many point to an essay by
sociologist Robert Martinson questioning the efficacy of certain rehabilitative interventions as the death
knell for the rehabilitative ideal. See Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About
Prison Reform, NAT'L AFF., Spring 1974, at 22, 49 (analyzing correctional rehabilitation programs and
concluding that the data "give us very little reason to hope that we have in fact found a sure way of
reducing recidivism through rehabilitation").
182. See Lacey & Pickard, supra note 130, at 6-7 (noting that the rehabilitative model provided
"little scope for responding to offenders as responsible and moral agents and thereby according them
the rights and respect-alongside punishment for blameworthy conduct-appropriate to that agency").
183. See Michael Tonry, Can Twenty-First Century Punishment Policies Be Justified in Principle?,
in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A FUTURE? 3, 8 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (noting that consequential-
ism "lost ground and influence" and "[r]etributivism came into vogue" in the 1970s).
184. See Lacey & Pickard, supra note 130, at 7 (stating that under the retributive model, "punish-
ment is justified in response to, by reason of, and in proportion to, the offender's desert"); see also JOHN
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Inherent in the shift to retributivism was a reimagining of the criminal
offender. The retributive regime imagines a criminal as an independent, rational
actor engaged in the "straightforward process of individual choice."1 "5 The
retributive criminal offender is a psychologically simplified and wholly indepen-
dent agent engaged in utility-maximizing decision making, uninfluenced by
structural, situational, and contextual influences such as poverty or depriva-
tion.18 6 In the inflamed political discourse that prevailed as this shift unfolded,
the criminal offender essentially lost his spot on the continuum of humanity. He
became a "different species of threatening, violent individual[] for whom we
can have no sympathy and for whom there is no effective help."18 7
This redefinition of the criminal offender triggered a redistribution of respon-
sibility for criminal behavior. By framing structural influences as irrelevant to
the offender's calculation, retributivism absolved the state of responsibility for
creating conditions that encourage criminal behavior.8 8 Responsibility for crime
prevention, therefore, came to fall primarily upon the offender himself to refrain
from criminal activity and secondarily on the victim to avoid risky scenarios.189
Consequently, the state's responsibility vis-h-vis crime was simplified. No
longer must the state ameliorate greater structural inequalities, bolster the social
welfare system in the name of crime prevention, or dedicate resources to
rehabilitating those who offend.1 90
This shift toward retributivism-and the concomitant embrace of the decontex-
tualized, rational actor conceptualization of criminal offenders-played an instru-
M. SLOOP, THE CULTURAL PRISON: DISCOURSE, PRISONERS, AND PUNISHMENT 139 (1996) ("A just deserts
model of punishment holds that, regardless of prisoner attributes (race, gender, socioeconomic back-
ground), the punishment must fit the crime, no more and no less.").
185. GARLAND, supra note 172, at 130; see Lacey & Pickard, supra note 130, at 7-8 (noting that
"[c]entral to culpability" under a retributivist model is the notion that offenders "knew what they were
doing when they committed the crime, and exercised choice and a sufficient degree of control in doing
so").
186. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 97.
187. GARLAND, supra note 172, at 136. This transition of the offender identity was also racialized.
The prototypical offender shifted from the "weak but redeemable white inmate" to a "wholly irredeem-
able 'other,' primarily identified as African American, who is best incarcerated to protect society."
Lynch, supra note 7, at 93.
188. See Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal Law
Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 3211, 3216 (2015) ("Depictions of monstrous offenders and opportunis-
tic minority criminals appealed to and reified public sentiment that dysfunction and harm are problems
of individual pathology rather than social structure.").
189. See GARLAND, supra note 172, at 124-27; see also Lynch, supra note 7, at 97 ("[S]tate penal
administrators and policymakers have shifted responsibility for dealing with the problem of crime onto
those subjected to criminal victimization and those subject to punishment.").
190. See Marie Gottschalk, The Folly of Neoliberal Prison Reform, Bos. REv. (June 8, 2015),
http:/Ibostonreview.net/books-ideas/marie-gottschalk-neoliberal-prison-reform-caught# [https://perma.
cc/S3ZQ-K64H] ("Problems such as crime, poverty, mass unemployment, and mass incarceration are
no longer seen as having fundamental structural causes that can be ameliorated via policies and
resources mobilized by the state. Rather, these problems are regarded as products either of fate or
individual action.").
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL
mental role in the seismic explosion of the United States' prison population.191
If crime is a choice, and if "nothing works" to rehabilitate offenders, then the
proper purpose of punishment is to impose a high enough cost for criminal
behavior that will deter most. 192 And those who choose to engage in criminal
activity, despite the cost, should be incapacitated-and for as long as pos-
sible. 193 Increasingly, harsh treatment came to be seen as part of the offender's
"just deserts" as the calculus of punishment came to reflect a judgment of not
just the offender's conduct but also the offender's character. 194
Currently, the United States occupies the "unenviable position as the unri-
valed leader among advanced economies in the costly business of mass imprison-
ment," with an imprisonment rate that far exceeds that of liberal market
economies with similar level of development. 195 Liberals and conservatives are,
once again, united in calling for reform of the criminal justice system as
consensus grows that the country incarcerates at a rate it lacks the capacity, 196
political will, 197 and even constitutional authority 98 to sustain.
The current focus of reform measures is on reducing the fiscal strain of
decades of "tough-on-crime" policies. Due, in large part, to these "budget-cut"
191. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 89 (discussing connection between the "well-documented late-
twentieth-century war on crime," the punitive sanctions "that came with it," and "new conceptualiza-
tions of the criminal/penal subject").
192. David Garland aptly describes punishment under this ideology as a "price mechanism" that
regulates the supply and demand of crime. GARLAND, supra note 172, at 130.
193. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 95 ("If the person to be punished has freely made choices ... punish-
ment, at best, need only function as a deterrent and/or incapacitator to redirect or block the decision to
commit crime . . .").
194. See Lacey & Pickard, supra note 130, at 9.
195. Nicola Lacey, American Imprisonment in Comparative Perspective, 139 DEDALUS 102, 102,
103 fig. 1 (2010) (demonstrating that between 2008 and 2009 the United States incarcerated at a rate
between four and five times higher than other liberal market economies).
196. See Fan, supra note 18, at 595-96; Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114
W. VA. L. REV. 415, 416-17 (2012). In 2014, then-Attomey General Eric Holder admitted that the
country's "overreliance on incarceration" is "financially unsustainable" and imposes "human and moral
costs." Matt Apuzzo, Holder Endorses Proposal to Reduce Drug Sentences in Latest Sign of Shift, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/us/politics/holder-endorses-proposal-to-
reduce-drug-sentences.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3G4A-NRCW].
197. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 11 (2007) (noting that recent data suggest
"Americans are increasingly skeptical of harsh prison sentences"). Conservative reformers have joined
the chorus of those who are critical of overreliance on incarceration. For example, Ken Cuccinelli and
Deborah Daniels, self-described "conservatives with backgrounds in law enforcement," recently wrote,
"For many offenders, prison is not the best answer," so "we would be foolish to ignore the need for a
course correction" in our incarceration-oriented criminal justice policies. Ken Cuccinelli & Deborah
Daniels, Opinion, Less Incarceration Could Lead to Less Crime, WASH. POST (June 19, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/less-incarceration-could-lead-to-less-crime/2014/06/19/03ffe
296-ef0e-11e3-bf76-447a5df6411flstory.html [https://perma.cc/D9K9-E9EV].
198. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 501-02 (2011) (upholding district court's decision that
the Eighth Amendment required California to reduce its prison population by approximately 40,000
prisoners).
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reform measures, the system is slowly beginning to correct its course.1 99 The
latest Bureau of Justice Statistics report indicates that in 2012 the country's
correctional population declined for the fourth straight year.2 0 0 However, al-
though these emergency reforms may provide temporary relief, they will not
bring about the systemic transformations our current carceral crisis demands. 0 1
Tellingly, the 2012 decline was the smallest in the four-year stretch of de-
clines, 202 and more than half of this decrease is attributable to reductions in
California's correctional population under the state's Public Safety Realignment
Act.2 0 3 And, despite these recent decreases, the United States continues to far
outpace all other nations in its incarceration rate, imprisoning 666 people per
100,000 of the nation's population.2 0 4 Moreover, these reforms are a backward-
looking effort to undo the mistakes of the past.
To meaningfully reduce our over-reliance on incarceration, we must expand
our focus beyond the fiscal bottom line and craft proactive, forward-looking
reforms. This will undoubtedly be a complicated project that implicates many
factors. But a crucial component of that complex endeavor must involve a
genuine reimagination of the criminal offender and a concomitant recalibration
of our punishment methodologies. As Marie Gottschalk recently argued:
If there is to be serious reform, we will have to look beyond the short-term
economic needs of the federal and state governments. We can't rely on
cost-benefit analysis to accomplish what only a deep concern for justice and
human rights can. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis is one of the principal tools of
the neoliberal politics on which the carceral state is founded.2 0 5
B. TREATMENT COURTS, ACCOUNTABILITY COURTS, AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
At first blush, many problem-solving courts appear to represent at least a
partial step toward this necessary redefinition of the criminal offender. Indeed,
many treatment courts embrace the notion that crime is not the product of
rational choice but rather a diseased mind. 2 0 6 Tellingly, some problem-solving-
199. See generally Fan, supra note 18 (discussing the future of penal law in the wake of budget-cut
criminal justice reforms).
200. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
NCJ 243936, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpusl2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WM5-TJNS].
201. See Fan, supra note 18, at 626-33.
202. GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 200, at 1.
203. Criminal Justice Realignment Act, A.B. No. 117, 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 39; Criminal Justice
Alignment Act, A.B. No. 109, 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 15; see GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 200, at 5.
204. Inst. for Criminal Policy Research, Highest to Lowest-Prison Population Rate, WORLD
PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison population rate?fieldregion
taxonomytid= All [https://perma.cc/LJ9W-HEMF] (ranking prison population rates worldwide).
205. Gottschalk, supra note 190.
206. See Bowers, supra note 134, at 787 ("[D]rug courts follow the philosophy that addiction is a
compulsive disease."); Hora et al., supra note 3, at 463-64 ("As opposed to using the traditional
2017] 1517
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL
court critics have lobbed a critique similar to that made of the old rehabilitative
system: that the courts authorize punishment in excess of a defendant's "just
deserts" in the name of rehabilitation.2 07
But, in fact, most problem-solving courts continue the retributivist project in
two interrelated and overlapping ways: (1) they further entrench the primacy of
individual responsibility, and (2) they continue to obscure the role of external
social factors that contribute to criminal behavior. Indeed, most problem-solving
courts stray from the rational actor theory only temporarily, if at all. For
example, as Josh Bowers has recounted, although drug courts purportedly
conceive of drug offenses as the result of a disease, not a calculated decision,
they do so only as long as the offender then makes the rational decision to
208 o
comply with treatment. If the offender struggles to comply, "a switch is
thrown and drug courts revert to economic conceptions of motivation and to
conventional punishment." 2 0 9 Thus, such courts send a "mixed message": "[A]d-
diction controls addicts' behavior at the time of the crime (at least to a
degree),... but addicts control their addictions at the time of treatment .... "2 1 0
In this way, drug courts engage in "responsibilization strategies" similar to
those employed by the retributive state.2 11 The "therapeutic paradigm" that
guides drug courts frames drug crime and relapse as symptoms of individual
failings, leaving the onus wholly on the defendant to address the internal
condition believed to have caused him to engage in criminal behavior.2 12 In this
context, the system continues to envision the defendant as an inherently and
ultimately rational actor-albeit one suffering from substance addiction-who
can and should choose to better his circumstances by completing a treatment
program instead of facing incarceration.2 13
By focusing myopically on the influence of addiction upon the defendant's
actions, these courts decontextualize drug crimes from the external circum-
stances in which they occur. They provide a "race- and class-neutral approach"
criminal justice paradigm, in which drug abuse is understood as a willful choice made by an offender
capable of choosing between right and wrong, DTCs shift the paradigm in order to treat drug abuse as a
'biopsychosocial disease."').
207. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Retributivism, Proportionality, and the Challenge of the Drug Court
Movement, in RETRIBUTIvISM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A FUTURE?, supra note 183, at 214; Judge Morris B.
Hoffman, Commentary, A Neo-Retributionist Concurs with Professor Nolan, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1567
(2003).
208. See Bowers, supra note 134, at 787-88.
209. Id. at 788.
210. Id. (emphasis omitted).
211. See Miller, supra note 8, at 425 ("The drug court's move from community to individual
self-control and self-esteem as the primary causes of drug crime and relapse, embraces what David
Garland calls a 'responsibilization strategy,' placing the onus on individuals to alter their conduct,
rather than on emphasizing rights to access government social welfare services."). See generally
GARLAND, supra note 172, at 124 (defining "responsibilization strategies").
212. See Miller, supra note 8, at 425-26.
213. See Bowers, supra note 134, at 828-30 (describing the "theoretically disjointed approach" of
drug courts, which "adopt a medical tactic when treating the participating patient, but a penal tactic
when disposing of treatment failures").
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to crime that is "focused on individual responsibility rather than social circum-
stances."2 14 Thus, consistent with the retributivist paradigm, they overlook the
influence of racial segregation, class stratification, and ways in which these
factors impinge on an individual's employment opportunities. Instead, they
frame the "problem" of drug crime as emanating from the defendant's "life
choices, rather than social choices about where and how to distribute [societal]
resources to different communities."2 15
Anthropologist Victoria Malkin made similar observations about the empha-
sis on individual responsibility and choice in her study of the Red Hook
Community Court. In this context, she noted, a discourse of personal responsibil-
ity and individual choice "override debates over social justice and equity, and
permit state coercion and control to continue unchallenged." 2 16 It begins with
the arraignment, which the court characterizes as an "opportunity" for the
defendant to better himself.2 17 He is then told he has a choice: he may choose to
help himself by agreeing to and complying with treatment or, alternatively, he
may opt for prison.2 18 This message is reiterated at each subsequent counseling
session and court appearance, with constant reminders to the defendant that he
has chosen his course and the consequences are "[his] and [his] alone." 21 9 By
situating offenders as directly and solely responsible for their predicament,
Malkin concludes, problem-solving courts strip away the role of "society" in
constructing their fate.2 20 In the process, all other causal determinates of
criminal behavior, including poverty, unfair policing practices, and the role of
privilege or advantage, "disappear into rhetoric of failed individual
decision-making.
214. Miller, supra note 8, at 425 (emphasis omitted).
215. Id. at 427, 437 ("Therapy and responsibility disaggregate the problem of drug crime from social
and governmental forces. They take the emphasis off the increasing racial segregation and class
stratification of the inner city, and emphasize the personal characteristics of the addict.").
216. Victoria Malkin, The End of Welfare As We Know It: What Happens When the Judge is in
Charge, 25 CRITIQUE ANTHROPOLOGY 361, 363 (2005).
217. See id. at 371.
218. See id. at 373, 377, 380.
219. Id. at 380. Malkin also notes that the court separates offenders into "those who want to help
themselves" by complying with the court's treatment and service programs, and the "others," who are
considered to choose prison over the alternative. Id. at 382. This separation, she argues, "turns prison
into a choice. Individual selves are what matter, and the system is there to engender these and provide
them with a chance to change." Id.
220. Id. at 370-71.
221. Id. at 371; see also Boldt, supra note 95, at 1172 (noting that the Red Hook Community Court
conceives of crimes as "problems of individual deviance"); Richard C. Boldt, The "Tomahawk" and the
"Healing Balm": Drug Treatment Courts in Theory and Practice, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION
GENDER & CLASs 45, 63-64 (2010) (discussing study finding that drug court judges engaged in
stigmatizing rather than reintegrative practices, focusing on "the individual defendant, not the act itself'
with comments such as "Don't you know what this stuff does to your brain!," "I'm tired of your
excuses," and "I'm through with you." (quoting Terance D. Miethe, Hong Lu & Erin Reese, Reintegra-
tive Shaming and Recidivism Risks in Drug Court: Explanations for Some Unexpected Findings, 46
CRIME & DELINQ. 522, 537 (2000))); Malkin, supra note 216, at 382 ("[T]he problem-solving approach
redefines crime as a therapeutic (scientific) problem, where poverty is erased as a causal determinant.
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Thus, instead of moving away from a myopic focus on individual responsibil-
ity, many problem-solving courts further entrench it. As a result, they fail to
account for the influence of structural conditions on criminal behavior. For this
reason, scholars have noted that the potential of the problem-solving-court
model to bring about widespread and lasting change is, ultimately, limited. For
example, Anthony Thompson has noted that, although some promote commu-
nity courts as a means of addressing homelessness by linking defendants to
social services, the courts ignore "the structural and systemic causes of homeless-
ness." 222 The courts' narrow focus on the individual and their use of coercive
state power to push the individual to get "some form of assistance," he notes,
".can have only a limited effect in eradicating homelessness." 2 2 3 Richard Boldt
recently came to a similar conclusion, arguing that, in contrast to the prevailing
problem-solving-court model that focuses on "individual deviance," a court that
accounted for "broad structural phenomena that either contribute to community
cohesion or dysfunction ... would better serve the human needs of its constitu-
ents." 2 24 These critiques underscore that most problem-solving courts actually
reinforce, rather than challenge, the retributivist rational actor model and con-
tinue to overlook external, structural factors that influence criminal behavior.
C. STATUS COURTS AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
Status courts represent a more promising step toward the redefinition of the
criminal offender and a reconceptualization of his or her relationship to the
state. In contrast to treatment and accountability courts, which continue retribu-
tivist individualization tactics, status courts take a broader view of the factors
and influences that contribute to criminal behavior. Indeed, the entire organizing
impetus behind these courts is that the offender does not embody a "problem" to
be "solved." The problem, rather, lies in the external influences upon an
offender's life that cause trauma. For veterans, the emphasis is on the traumatic
influence of military service; for girls, abuse and coercion. For example, the
Commander of the first veterans court in Oregon remarked, upon its opening in
2010 that"[v]eterans have a whole different bag of ghosts they carry." 2 2 5 The
goal of the court is "to respond in a manner cognizant of those ghosts and the
interventions necessary to bring wellness to the veteran defendant."2 26 Judge Jo
Ann Ferdinand was moved by a similar sentiment to open New York City's first
veterans court upon observing that a Vietnam veteran defendant in her court-
room was "still carrying . .. invisible wounds" from his military service that
Policing and unfair arrests disappear as the discourse moves into a therapeutic mode. Increased policing
and longer criminal records form the backbone as they enable the court to have more leverage and
control over individuals, and the unsuccessful 'clients' can be sent back into the prison population.").
222. Thompson, supra note 36, at 90.
223. Id.
224. Boldt, supra note 95, at 1172.
225. Tillson, supra note 83.
226. Id.
1520 [Vol. 105:1481
STATUS COURTS
were "effecting [sic] his behavior." 22 7 The Oahu girls court similarly embraces
the notion that the girls who come before it are complex individuals who,
though appearing before the court "as an offender," are often "victims of
physical or sexual abuse or domestic violence themselves."22 8 In other words,
girls courts reflect a judgment that girls commit delinquency offenses, at least in
part, because of the negative influence of another person or experience.
Thus, although status courts, like other problem-solving courts and criminal
courts in general, strive to hold offenders accountable for their actions, they also
seek to account for the role of structural factors and external experiences in
contributing to criminal behavior. In so doing, they move away from the
conceptualization of criminal offenders as disembodied rational actors who
independently choose to commit criminal activity. Instead, they advance a
contextualized definition of offenders that acknowledges that criminal behavior
originates in a "structural causal setting" and results from a complex combina-
tion of interrelated factors. 2 2 9 According to this more nuanced conceptualization
of criminal behavior, individual agency is not irrelevant but rather is exercised
in a specific context that is shaped by structural factors and extrinsic experiences.
Through their acknowledgement of the influence of external factors upon
criminal offenders, status courts begin to partially redistribute responsibility for
criminal behavior. In these courts, unlike conventional courts and other problem-
solving courts, the defendant does not bear the sole responsibility for his or her
actions; rather, responsibility is shared between the offender and those who
caused the trauma that contributed to the criminal behavior. In veterans courts,
that "other" is the state. Indeed, proponents of veterans courts explicitly invoke
a sense of national responsibility for "breaking" these individuals by sending
them into combat and a corresponding duty to "fix" them instead of punishing
them. 2 3 0 The redistribution that takes place in girls courts is more subtle. By
227. Meriwether, supra note 49.
228. FAQs, HAw. GIRLS CT, supra note 69.
229. See Weissman, supra note 123, at 224, 248 (noting that veterans courts consider "the context of
crime as [a] condition of addressing [criminal] behavior").
230. See, e.g., Laura Fong, Justice Stratton: Ohio Vets Courts Recognize What Society Has De-
manded, WKSU 89.7 (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.wksu.org/news/story/29917 [https://perma.cc/JNG5-
WFR8] ("They come out [of war], they're damaged. They have all sorts of issues they didn't have
before. We damaged them by sending them to defend us. We have this special extra obligation to really
reach out and try to make their lives different."); Carol Hopkins, 'We Owe Them a Debt': Veterans
Courts on the Rise in Oakland County, OAKLAND PRESS (June 29, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.
theoaklandpress.com/article/OP/20130629/NEWS/306299977 [https://perma.cc/J8TN-ETHP] ("We en-
gage these individuals to go into combat and the next thing you know they have a knife to the throat of
their wife from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. We owe them a commitment to habilitate [CQ]
them. . . ." (quoting Waterford Township District Judge Jodi Debbrecht Switalski)); Megan McCloskey,
Veterans Court Takes a Chance on Violent Offenders, STARS & STRIPES (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.
stripes.com/veterans-court-takes-a-chance-on-violent-offenders- 1.118182 [https://perma.cc/4VMV-FEB4].
The Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in Porter v. McCollum, finding ineffective assistance of
counsel in a capital domestic violence homicide prosecution for failing to present evidence of the
defendant's military service to show not only that "he served honorably under extreme hardship and
gruesome conditions" but also "the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took on
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acknowledging that many of the girls commit offenses because of trauma
resulting from abuse, court actors implicitly shift responsibility to those who
have abused or taken advantage of the girls for contributing to their criminal
behavior.
In addition to redistributing responsibility, status courts also begin to redefine
the criminal offender in another significant way: they literally break down the
"othering" effect of the retributivist model that most problem-solving courts
replicate. Unlike treatment and accountability courts, which target a negative
trait or behavior that separates the defendant from society, status courts are
organized around a positive characteristic the offender shares with the others in
the community. A distinguishing feature of many status courts is that they are
staffed by people who share the offender's status and who are willing to draw
on the shared experiences to offer the offender support and mentorship through-
out the court process. Significantly, in both veterans courts and girls courts, state
actors-including judges-actively identify with the offenders, despite their
wrongdoings. For example, Judge Patrick Dugan, himself a veteran, reflected
that he was able to relate to the defendants who come before him in the
Philadelphia Municipal Veterans Court because "I've been there, done that,
walked in their boots-I speak the language."2 3 1 Similarly, Judge Michael
Brennan identifies as a mentor to the defendants who appear before him in the
veterans court in Brooklyn, New York, noting that he will "come down [from
the bench] to [the defendants'] level as a brother and sister and work with
[them]."232
Status courts properly refocus the criminal justice intervention on the conduct
of the offender, not his or her character.2 33 Throughout the court process, status
court offenders are reminded that, though they have engaged in wrongdoing,
they nevertheless remain "good people." As the Director of the New York
Veterans Service Agency testified before the House of Representatives Commit-
tee on Veterans Affairs, veterans in the criminal justice system "are not bad
people; they just got caught up with the wrong people, places and things."2 34
With this move, status courts take an important, albeit counterintuitive turn:
although they improperly employ moral judgments to sort offenders into the
courts, they effectively decouple morality from responsibility as they mete out
[the defendant]." 558 U.S. 30, 43-44 (2009) (per curiam). Significantly, in that same decision, the Court
took defense counsel to task for failing to present evidence of the defendant's abusive childhood,
because it may have had "particular salience" for the jury in assessing his abusive behavior toward the
decedent. Id. at 43.
231. Ines Novacic, For Veterans in Legal Trouble, Special Courts Can Help, CBS NEWS (Nov. 10,
2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/for-veterans-legal-trouble-special-courts-can-help/
[https://perma.cc/PPY7-KCV5].
232. Gomez, supra note 79.
233. See Lacey & Pickard, supra note 130, at 27 ("Judgement of the conduct for which an offender
is responsible is the business of the criminal process.").
234. Weissman, supra note 123, at 247.
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punishment.2 35
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE REFORM
Though status courts are an inherently practical and grounded innovation, this
Part establishes that their important impact lies in how state actors theorize
offenders. Status courts respond to offenders as complex individuals who come
to the criminal justice system with a history as both offenders and, often,
victims of an unjust past. The most effective way to take this insight "to scale"
is not to create more specialized courts-status or otherwise-but rather to use
this contextualized conceptualization to guide different kinds of investments in
criminal justice reform.
Some will inevitably suggest that, because status courts are doing something
right, the solution is to create more of them. However, the proliferation of status
courts is not the best response for many reasons. First, the creation of courts for
additional status groups would perpetuate the troubling moral sorting inherent
in the status court model itself. Inevitably many-and perhaps most-would be
sorted out of such reforms based on judgments that they do not deserve
specialized treatment. Although it is easy to imagine the creation of courts for
single mothers, peace officers, or other popularly sympathetic populations,
mobilizing resources in support of a court for those who grew up in violent
neighborhoods, for example, or are influenced by structural racism or homopho-
bia would be "politically problematical,"2 36 to say the least. If status courts
actually fulfill their promise to close the revolving door to the criminal justice
237
system, it would be unfair and unjust to continue to parcel out rehabilitative
possibilities based on the idea that certain populations are more deserving of a
chance to avoid incarceration than others. Concomitantly, for the reasons dis-
cussed above, the creation of additional courts would further entrench old ways
of doing business for those left to the conventional system.
One way to avoid this moral sorting would be to broaden the scope of these
courts to allow entry to all offenders who commit crimes as a result of past
traumatic experiences. In other words, to create a trauma court. A trauma court
would differ from existing mental health courts in that it would take the extra
step exhibited in status courts to move away from individual responsibilization
strategies and toward a more holistic and complicated view of the circumstances
and motivations that led to the immediate offense. A trauma court, unlike a
mental health court, would not simply seek to fix a "problem" believed to be
internal to the offender but would strive, as status courts do, to understand and
235. See generally Lacey & Pickard, supra note 130, at 7-10 (discussing how the current retributiv-
ist paradigm conflates morality and criminal responsibility through the emphasis on affective blame
which, in turn, justifies the implementation of harsh treatment).
236. See Weissman supra note 123, at 247-48 (observing that comparing veterans to others remains
"politically problematical").
237. But see infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text (discussing the contested efficacy of status
courts).
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account for the traumatic experiences beyond the offender's control that contrib-
uted to criminal behavior.2 38
Such an approach, though more promising, is nevertheless unsatisfactory.
Scholars have provided many compelling reasons to believe that the problem-
solving court model is itself inherently flawed. For example, many have made
the counterintuitive observation that creating a problem-solving court often
increases the number of criminal cases that are initiated in a jurisdiction, which,
in turn, increases, rather than decreases, the fiscal demands on the system.2 39
This occurs as a result of the "net-widening" effect, which occurs when
problem-solving courts "pull members of the community into the criminal
justice system who would otherwise have avoided it." 2 4 0
Another body of scholarship highlights the downsides to participation in
problem-solving programs for criminal defendants. Many have criticized these
courts for requiring defendants to sacrifice important procedural protections,
including the zealous advocacy of a defense attorney. 24 1 Others have demon-
strated that participation in a problem-solving-court program may increase the
risk that a defendant will be incarcerated. As Allegra McLeod recently con-
cluded based on her extensive analysis of the prevailing criminal law reformist
models that prevail in problem-solving courts, most problem-solving courts
follow a model that is incarceratory, not decarceratory.24 2 Problem-solving court
participation often imposes a number of demands upon defendants not present
in conventional courts, such as reporting and treatment requirements,2 43 while it
increases the length of the defendant's contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem.24 4 This extended exposure to court surveillance, combined with the often
onerous participation requirements, provides defendants with ample opportunity
to violate the terms of their participation agreement in a way that sends them
back to prison. Those who fail to complete programs typically face an incarcera-
tory sentence, and the sentence imposed after program failure tends to be longer
than that which would have been imposed in a conventional court.24 5
238. For the reasons proffered by Youngjae Lee, trauma resulting from one's own culpable conduct
would not qualify for entry into a trauma court. See Youngjae Lee, Military Veterans, Culpability &
Blame, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 285, 289-93 (2013).
239. See, e.g., Jaros, supra note 99, at 1513-14.
240. Id.; see also Boldt, supra note 4, at 17-18 (discussing how problem-solving courts produce a
"net-widening" effect by failing to divert "defendants who would otherwise have avoided [the] criminal
justice system").
241. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 4.
242. See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1591.
243. See, e.g., id. at 1662 (quoting former drug court prosecutor as describing the problem-solving
court programs as "tougher than the alternatives").
244. See Miller, supra note 139, at 1559 ("Drug court advocates often maintain that offenders spend
more time in drug court than they would in prison."); Nancy Wolff et al., Mental Health Courts and
Their Selection Processes: Modeling Variation for Consistency, 35 L. & Hum. BEHAV. 402, 408 (2011)
(noting that misdemeanor mental health court participants generally are "under court supervision longer
than if they plead guilty in criminal court").
245. See Boldt, supra note 95, at 1143 (concluding that a "significant subset" of drug court
defendants fail the treatment program, and their outcome measures are "likely to be as bad or worse"
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Finally, there is a lively and ongoing debate as to whether problem-solving
courts actually provide the cost savings they promise, which provides yet
another reason to be "circumspect" of the promises of problem-solving jus-
tice 24 and counsel against further proliferation of problem-solving courts-
status courts or otherwise.
In any event, the promise of status courts lies neither in the separation of
populations into specialized courts nor in the provision of therapeutic services
to court participation2" By encouraging system actors to acknowledge the way
that structural factors and experiences beyond the offender's control contribute
to criminal behavior, status courts disrupt the retributivist paradigm and ad-
vance a new definition of the criminal offender. Because adoption of the
independent rational actor model was central to the ratcheting up of sanctions,
popularization of the image of the offender advanced by status courts would
help reduce its impact. Moreover, acknowledging the influence of other ways in
which society is responsible for criminal behavior-for example, through the
perpetuation of structural economic and racial inequalities-reduces the state's
than those who were processed through the conventional court system); Bowers, supra note 134, at 792
(discussing studies conducted by the Center for Court Innovation which found that "the sentences for
failing participants in New York City drug courts were typically two-to-five times longer than the
sentences for conventionally adjudicated defendants").
246. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 1, at 1591 n.12 (discussing empirical studies that demonstrate
problem-solving courts "reduce costs and recidivism"). Other studies, however, suggest otherwise. See
RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURrs: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 6
(2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Drug-Courts-A-Review-of-the-
Evidence.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP8V-LYG2] ("Some studies show little or no impact from drug court
participation .... ); Hoffman, supra note 136, at 1480 (noting that many formal studies of drug court
efficacy conclude that drug courts "are effective in speeding drug cases through the system" but have
"only a marginal impact, if any, in reducing recidivism"). And still others come to conflicting
conclusions. In 2005, for example, the GAO analyzed 27 drug court evaluations. Somewhat unsurpris-
ingly, it found that drug courts reduced recidivism rates while the participant was involved in the court
program. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABLITY OFFICE, supra note 149, at 5. But it identified mixed results in
other areas, such as relapse rates. See id. at 6. For an in-depth discussion of the GAO study, see Boldt,
supra note 221, at 50-57.
Thus, current data are, at best, mixed about whether drug courts work. See id. at 49-50 (reviewing
meta-analyses of drug court efficacy and suggesting the results are mixed). And data available for other
types of problem-solving courts are scant and even less conclusive. See Mitchell B. Mackinem & Paul
Higgins, Introduction to PROBLEM-SOLVING COURrs: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? vii, ix (Paul
Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009) ("While adult drug courts have been highly researched
and evaluated, others such as domestic violence courts are almost unstudied."). For example, a 2009
literature review of mental health courts revealed that there was "some research" that had the
"potential" to produce cost savings. See LAUREN ALMQUIST & ELIZABETH DODD, COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS
JUSTICE CTR., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A GUIDE TO RESEARCH-INFORMED POLICY AND PRACTICE 26 (2009),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/CSGMHCResearch.pdf [https://perma.cc/C475-WA7H]. This re-
view also found that mental health court participants were "as likely to spend additional time in jail as
people whose cases were processed in the traditional court system." Id. at 24.
247. See Boldt, supra note 4, at 14-15.
248. In fact, many have offered compelling arguments about why therapy should be unhinged from
punishment altogether. See, e.g., id. at 15-18 (critiquing the merger of treatment and punishment in
problem-solving courts).
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moral standing to punish.24 9 Importantly, the suggestion is not that we draw on
the insight of status courts to absolve offenders of responsibility, but rather that
we use it to think about responsibility differently, striving to acknowledge that
offenders act both out of agency and circumstance. In other words, it is about
how, not whether, to punish.25 0
Operationalizing this theoretical insight should have a tangible, practical
impact. It will require us to reimagine how we mete out justice-both in kind
and amount-and change our practices accordingly. The contextualization of
criminal behavior should lead, as it does in status courts, to more respectful,
compassionate interactions between system actors and the defendants. In large
part, the different tenor of status court proceedings results from the willingness
of judges to empathize with defendants.25 1 In status courts, empathy flows from
the commonality of experience, because judges relate directly and quite literally
to an experience of having been a veteran or a girl. Of course, we cannot and
should not countenance a criminal justice system in which judges can adjudicate
offenses only against defendants with whom they share a common experience.
Fortunately, empathy can also be promoted through imagination.2 52 We should
encourage judges to pause the assembly line of justice long enough to both
understand and acknowledge the external, traumatic influences that impact
those offenders whose experiences they do not share and respond accordingly.
This introduction of empathy may well lead to the imposition of less punitive
sentences.25 3 But at the very least, it should improve the tenor of the court
process, showing defendants that system actors strive to understand their circum-
stances and respond appropriately. This may, in turn, increase defendants' sense
254
of procedural justice, which can reduce recidivism regardless of the sentence
imposed.
Embracing the notion that criminal behavior results, at least in part, because
of past experiences beyond the offender's control should also mitigate the
harshness of the criminal sanctions judges impose by tempering the influence of
affective blame upon punishment. As Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard have
recounted, as the retributivist paradigm gained prominence, so too did the
249. See Lacey & Pickard, supra note 130, at 24; see also Lee, supra note 238, at 300-02
(discussing how society's standing to punish veterans who commit crimes because of service-related
PTSD is diminished).
250. In this way, the emphasis of this analysis is different from the strain of "rotten social
background" literature that focuses on whether and when a defendant's background should exculpate
him of criminal liability. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal
Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 L. & INEQUALITY 9 (1985).
251. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown As a Cause of Mass
Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 190 (2011) ("[E]mpathy is the ability to see and feel the
world through another's eyes.").
252. Id. (citing empirical studies showing that empathy can be promoted through "at least two ways:
imagination and experience").
253. Id. at 184 ("[E]mpathy is a prerequisite to compassion, which in turn fosters the impulse to
mitigate punishment.").
254. See Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 165 (1990).
1526 [Vol. 105:1481
STATUS COURTS
influence of affective blame, or the "range of hostile, negative attitudes and
emotions that are typical human responses to blameworthiness,"25 5 on sentenc-
ing. Affective blame justified the ratcheting up of criminal sanctions as harsh
treatment came to be seen as part of the offender's "just deserts."25 6 Drawing
insights from the clinical treatment of individuals with agency disorders, Lacey
and Pickard observe that clinicians' ability to take their patients' histories into
account to see them "both as perpetrators and as victims" tempers the influence
of affective blame.25 7 Instead, clinicians practice "detached blame," or "respon-
sibility without [affective] blame," through which they require patients to
account for their transgressions and impose negative sanctions, if necessary,
while avoiding detrimental-and unjustified-harsh treatment and stigma.2 58
In sum, systemically embracing the insight of status courts requires an
investment in a different kind of criminal justice system, but that investment is
mainly conceptual and behavioral, not economic. And yet, changing how we
envision criminal offenders should change the kinds of economic investments
we make. For, as Mona Lynch has noted, "[t]he ways in which the population
that is to be punished is imagined by policy makers, court personnel, penal
administrators, and others who are in the business of state punishment necessar-
ily shapes the kinds of investments states have made in their penal machin-
ery." 2 5 9 Adopting a more holistic view of the factors that contribute to criminal
behavior should lead away from additional funding for harsh punitive policies
and toward investment in a system oriented toward proactively funding services
and opportunities that will prevent people from coming into contact with the
criminal justice system altogether.
CONCLUSION
There is no simple solution to our carceral crisis, but it is inevitable that
purportedly data-driven, "evidence-based practices" like problem-solving courts
will continue to inspire criminal justice reform efforts. Our ability to capture
and analyze data has, and will, continue to increase. 26 0 As it does, we should no
longer countenance the use of data as a veil for morality-driven decisions. If we
are to base programs and policies on data, we must be willing to lead where it
follows, even if that means offering rehabilitative opportunities to individuals
who are currently deemed too risky for such an investment. Moreover, instead
of using data to exclude offenders through the creation of specialized tribunals
and processes, I propose that we begin to use data to include them in the
255. Lacey & Pickard, supra note 130, at 3.
256. See id. at 9-10.
257. Id. at 22-23.
258. See id. at 19-20.
259. Lynch, supra note 7, at 89.
260. See Walter J. Dickey & Peggy A. McGarry, The Search for Justice and Safety Through
Community Engagement: Community Justice and Community Prosecution, 42 IDAHo L. REV. 313,
338-39 (2006).
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rehabilitation process to identify connections and make changes that impact
more people.
Meanwhile, it is essential that we embrace a more holistic view of criminal
offenders, one that acknowledges that they often are products of a complicated
past, influenced by a range of conditions and experiences beyond their control,
and that the state often bears some responsibility in the creation of those
conditions. Status courts show that system actors can and do put this theory into
practice. It is time to take this insight "to scale."
